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KHRISTA MCCARDEN*
High-net-worth taxpayers continue to hide assets offshore, and offshore 
tax enforcement remains an immense problem for the United States. In 
2016, the Panama Papers revealed another previously unnoticed 
reason that high-net-worth tax cheats place assets offshore: to hide 
them from their spouses during divorce proceedings. Typically, these 
offshore tax evaders also will refuse to disclose their offshore accounts 
during divorce proceedings even though required to do so. The 
individuals hiding offshore assets in this manner are predominantly 
males. Ultimately, their wives are forced to hire forensic accountants to 
trace an extensive maze of offshore ownership during the divorce.
This Article proposes a novel solution to the problem of offshore tax 
enforcement by using high-net-worth divorces. Currently, an offshore 
tax evader may frustrate his wife’s attempts to discover family assets 
held offshore during divorce proceedings and still remain eligible for 
tax amnesty programs. Moreover, he can later claim that he did not 
“willfully” hide assets from tax authorities and thereby escape criminal 
prosecution. This Article solves these two problems in a manner that 
will strengthen offshore tax enforcement while truncating prolonged 
divorce proceedings.
In addition, currently, a wife who learns of her husband’s offshore tax 
fraud during divorce will face civil and criminal liability as well, unless 
she can secure innocent spouse relief. Such relief is difficult to attain
due to existing inequities and misperceptions about financial and other 
forms of domestic abuse. As a result, our current approach protects the 
guilty, high-net-worth tax cheat who refuses to disclose his offshore 
assets either to tax authorities or to his wife. At the same time, it 
diminishes the chances that his wife will ever whistle blow to the 
Internal Revenue Service by failing to protect her from civil and 
criminal liability. This Article argues for reforms in the areas of family 
law and tax law that would (1) hold high-net-worth husbands 
accountable for noncompliance in both contexts and (2) incentivize 
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wives to whistle blow using information about offshore assets gathered 
from the divorce proceedings.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last two years, the American public has become keenly aware of 
hidden issues that will shape our nation’s legal landscape, debates, and choices 
for decades to come.1 These developments have relevant implications for 
another issue related to secrecy: the hiding of offshore wealth.2 According to a 
recent Tax Justice Network report, wealthy individuals are holding over $21 
trillion to $32 trillion of unreported private wealth offshore.3 Offshore tax 
enforcement is a legal regime aimed at catching wealthy tax evaders that 
remains a top priority for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in 2018.4 However, 
the United States largely ignores a context where information regarding offshore 
assets is gleaned, i.e., high-net-worth divorce proceedings.5
It is undeniable and commonly known that one use of offshore accounts is 
to hide assets from tax authorities.6 Nevertheless, the Panama Papers revealed 
                                                                                                                     
1 See infra notes 6–27 and accompanying text.
2 Id. 
3 See JAMES S. HENRY, THE PRICE OF OFFSHORE REVISITED 36 (2012),
http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Price_of_Offshore_Revisited_120722.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z3BK-ELVP].
4 I.R.S. News Release IR-2018-64 (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs
-offshore-tax-cheating-remains-on-dirty-dozen-list-of-tax-scams [https://perma.cc/3UYV-
M2SS]; I.R.S. News Release IR-2017-35 (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/
irs-committed-to-stopping-offshore-tax-cheating-remains-on-dirty-dozen-list-of-tax-scams-
for-2017 [https://perma.cc/Z5DB-3FX6] [hereinafter IRS, “Dirty Dozen” News Release] 
(“Offshore compliance remains a top IRS priority.”). The IRS has noted that the avoidance 
of taxes by “hiding money or assets in unreported offshore accounts” remains on its list of 
top tax scams known as the ‘Dirty Dozen.’ Id.
5 See infra Part I.A.
6 See Scott D. Michel et al., U.S. Offshore Account Enforcement Issues, 16 J. TAX
PRAC. & PROC. 49, 49–73 (2014); Carolyn Michelle Najera, Note, Combating Offshore Tax 
Evasion: Why the United States Should Be Able to Prevent American Tax Evaders from 
Using Swiss Bank Accounts to Hide Their Assets, 17 SW. J. INT’L L. 205, 206–07 (2011); see
also Shu-Yi Oei, The Offshore Tax Enforcement Dragnet, 67 EMORY L.J. 655, 732 (2018) 
(explaining one of the largest challenges facing the United States is “to catch and enforce the 
law against egregious and willful high-net-worth tax evaders”); Lawrence J. Trautman, 
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another less obvious use of offshore accounts: hiding assets from a spouse 
during a divorce.7 The Panama Papers divulged that public officials, drug 
dealers, money launderers, and unexpectedly, high-net-worth divorcees all use 
offshore accounts to hide assets.8 The source of the leak was a Panamanian firm 
named Mossack Fonseca, and it confessed to at least considering aiding wealthy 
individuals with hiding assets from their spouses in a type of pre-divorce 
planning designed to prevent a claim to those assets.9
In October 2017, the #MeToo movement10 and the indictment of President 
Trump’s former campaign manager, Paul Manafort, showed the world that 
powerful men also must face consequences for their misdeeds, including their 
offshore ones.11 Last year, the momentum of the anti-sexual harassment 
#MeToo movement thrust the hidden marginalization and objectification of both 
famous and unknown women alike into unwavering light for all to see.12 No 
longer would the latent sins of prominent American men remain out of focus 
due to the courage of women.
Later in October 2017, the indictment of Manafort for failure to report 
foreign bank and financial accounts, inter alia, brought the secret world of 
offshore companies and assets to sharp focus yet again.13 Recently, the IRS has 
                                                                                                                     
Following the Money: Lessons from the Panama Papers, Part 1: Tip of the Iceberg, 121 
PENN ST. L. REV. 807, 809–10 (2017).
7 See, e.g., Ana Swanson, How the World’s Wealthy Hide Millions Offshore – From 
Their Spouses, WASH. POST (Apr. 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/
wp/2016/04/19/how-the-worlds-wealthy-hide-millions-offshore-from-their-spouses/?utm_t
erm=.b0638d4cf3ad [https://perma.cc/EEA9-UM2P].
8 See, e.g., id.; Will Fitzgibbon, How the One Percenters Divorce: Offshore Intrigue 
Plays Hide and Seek with Millions, INT’L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Apr. 
3, 2016), https://panamapapers.icij.org/20160403-divorce-offshore-intrigue.html [https://perma.cc
/6HHD-CE83].
9 See Swanson, supra note 7.
10 See, e.g., Jessica Bennett, The #MeToo Moment: No Longer Complicit, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/07/us/the-metoo-moment-no-longer-
complicit.html [on file with the Ohio State Law Journal].
11 See, e.g., Robert W. Wood, IRS Tax Lessons for Everyone from Paul Manafort 
Indictment, FORBES (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2017/10/31/irs-
tax-lessons-for-everyone-from-paul-manafort-indictment/#18010881754b [https://perma.cc/EN
Y4-UHBL].
12 See Bennett, supra note 10.
13 Indictment at 19–20, United States v. Manafort 313 F. Supp. 3d 213 (D.D.C. 2018), 
(No. 1:17-cr-00201) [hereinafter Indictment] (alleging that from 2008 through 2014, 
Manafort did not file a FBAR or indicate on Schedule B that he owned foreign bank 
accounts). U.S. citizens are required to file a form, known as a Foreign Bank and Financials 
Account Report (FBAR), if they control (directly or through a legal entity) a foreign bank 
account that has a balance over $10,000 at any time during the taxable year. 31 U.S.C. § 5314 
(2012); 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350 (2018); Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts 
(FBAR), INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-
employed/report-of-foreign-bank-and-financial-accounts-fbar [https://perma.cc/YF5N-
R67V] (last updated Jan. 28, 2019) (stating under “Who Must File an FBAR” those required 
to file are United Persons with a financial interest in or signatory authority over at least one 
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noted that individuals who maintain foreign financial accounts and fail to 
comply with U.S. reporting requirements “are breaking the law and risk 
significant fines, as well as the possibility of criminal prosecution.”14 The 
indictment alleges, “Manafort used his hidden overseas wealth to enjoy a lavish 
lifestyle in the United States, without paying taxes on that income.”15 It also 
contends that Manafort and Rick Gates “funneled millions of dollars in 
payments into foreign nominee companies and bank accounts, opened by them 
and their accomplices in . . . Cyprus, Saint Vincent & the Grenadines . . . and 
the Seychelles.”16 FBI agents entered Mr. and Mrs. Manafort’s condominium 
before dawn after the indictment,17 and ultimately, on August 21, 2018, 
Manafort was convicted of eight counts of tax and bank fraud, including one 
count of not reporting a foreign bank account.18 Mrs. Manafort, an attorney, has 
been involved with her husband’s multi-million-dollar real estate acquisitions.19
It is unclear whether she was aware of her husband’s failure to report offshore 
accounts.20
Meanwhile, in early 2018, former White House staff secretary Rob Porter’s
two ex-wives exposed just how incorrectly the United States perceives domestic 
violence and abuse in alleging their former husband engaged in verbal and 
                                                                                                                     
foreign financial account and whose aggregate foreign financial accounts exceed $10,000 at 
any point during the calendar year). Additionally, Form 1040 requires taxpayers to answer 
questions on Schedule B regarding the existence of foreign bank accounts. About Schedule 
B (Form 1040), Interest and Ordinary Dividends, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.
gov/forms-pubs/about-schedule-b-form-1040 [https://perma.cc/G5QZ-ZNBX] (last updated Dec. 
7, 2018).
14 See IRS, “Dirty Dozen” News Release, supra note 4.
15 Indictment, supra note 13, at 2; see Rowan Scarborough, FBI Agents Manhandled 
Manafort and His Wife During Pre-Dawn Raid in Intimidation Effort, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 
1, 2017), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/nov/1/fbi-agents-manhandled-
manafort-and-his-wife-during/ [https://perma.cc/5SLE-2ZRB].
16 Indictment, supra note 13, at 2.
17 See Scarborough, supra note 15.
18 Sharon LaFraniere, Paul Manafort, Trump’s Former Campaign Chairman, Guilty of 
8 Counts, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/21/us/politics/pa
ul-manafort-trial-verdict.html [https://perma.cc/3824-35JH].
19 See Áine Cain, Paul Manafort’s Wife Kathleen Has Been a Quietly Pivotal Part of 
the Investigation Against Him—Here’s Everything We Know, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 31, 2017), 
https://www.businessinsider.in/law-order/paul-manaforts-wife-kathleen-has-been-a-quietly
-pivotal-part-of-the-investigation-against-him-heres-everything-we-know/articleshow/6135
0660.cms [https://perma.cc/U4E3-RHLS] (explaining that Kathleen Manafort’s role in tax 
fraud is not lucid but noting funds from offshore accounts were used to purchase U.S. real 
estate, including properties in New York and Virginia); Scarborough, supra note 15. An IRS 
agent testified that approximately $9 million was transferred from Manafort’s offshore 
accounts to the United States and about $6.7 million of this amount was used to purchase 
personal real estate in New York and Virginia. Del Quentin Wilber & Aruna Viswanatha,
IRS Agent Testifies Manafort Failed to Declare More than $16 Million on Taxes, WALL ST.
J. (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/forensic-accountant-next-up-in-manafort-
trial-as-gates-ends-testimony-1533748826 [https://perma.cc/Q3X4-MQGM].
20 Cain, supra note 19.
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physical abuse.21 Porter’s second wife, Jennie Willoughby, poignantly stated:
“Society as a whole doesn’t acknowledge the reality of abuse.”22 Ms.
Willoughby has pointed out the cultural norm that often pervades our legal 
system, as well as the questioning of the victim of the abuse instead of 
embarrassing an abuser.23 Colbie Holderness, Porter’s first wife, noted that 
often women are with their abusers for an extended period of time.24 Ms. 
Holderness explained, “[t]hey marry them, become financially intertwined with 
them, have children with them.”25 Suddenly, U.S. politicians and the general 
public were asked to acknowledge that abuse happens to “the poor and the rich, 
the least educated and the most” and is committed by those with “a stellar 
résumé and background.”26 Ultimately, Porter stepped down from his role after 
these allegations surfaced.27
Examining these three stories, several questions arise that are relevant to 
how we view offshore tax enforcement. What if, similar to women prior to the 
#MeToo movement, wives of wealthy tax evaders fear the implications of 
disclosing their husbands’ bad tax behavior and thus have remained silent, even 
during divorce? An article in the U.K. Guardian disclosed that several members 
of President Trump’s Administration, including his chief economic adviser who 
spearheaded the latest tax reform effort, have offshore dealings, providing 
further evidence of an offshore network comprised of wealthy U.S. men.28
                                                                                                                     
21 See Colbie Holderness, Rob Porter Is My Ex-Husband. Here’s What You Should 
Know About Abuse., WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinio
ns/rob-porter-is-my-ex-husband-heres-what-you-should-know-about-abuse/2018/02/12/3c7
edcb8-1033-11e8-9065-e55346f6de81_story.html?utm_term=.92486d5654e4 [https://perma.cc/6
Y3F-4RBJ].
22 Jennie Willoughby, ‘President Trump Will Not Diminish My Truth,’ TIME (Feb. 11, 
2018), http://time.com/5143589/rob-porter-ex-wife-trump-domestic-violence/ 
[https://perma.cc/P65H-B6JL]; see Maggie Haberman & Katie Rogers, Rob Porter, White 
House Aide, Resigns After Accusations of Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/07/us/politics/rob-porter-resigns-abuse-white-house-
staff-secretary.html [https://perma.cc/Y8UV-2ABJ]. 
23 See Willoughby, supra note 22. (“The tendency to avoid, deny, or cover up abuse is 
never really about power, or money, or an old boys’ club. It is deeper than that. Rather than 
embarrass an abuser, society is subconsciously trained to question a victim of abuse.”).
24 Holderness, supra note 21.
25 Id.
26 See id.; Michael Levenson, Rob Porter Was ‘Quintessential Golden Boy’ from 
Belmont Now Accused of Abuse, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com
/metro/2018/02/09/rob-porter-was-quintessential-golden-boy-from-belmont-now-accused-
abuse-two-wives/NloiHioR0akJShDV2AqD4O/story.html [https://perma.cc/9DR9-4PZH] 
(commenting that Rob Porter is a Rhodes Scholar and a Harvard Law School graduate). 
27 See Willoughby, supra note 22; Levenson, supra note 26.
28 See Jon Swaine & Ed Pilkington, The Wealthy Men in Trump’s Inner Circle with 
Links to Tax Havens, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 5, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2
017/nov/05/wealthy-men-donald-trump-inner-circle-links-tax-havens [https://perma.cc/EK4A-
APZ3] (listing ten political officers, including Randal Quarles: “The Trump administration’s
most senior banking watchdog [who] appears in the Paradise Papers in connection with an 
offshore bank that is under investigation by U.S. authorities for possible tax evasion.”); see 
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Surely, some of the men in this offshore circle have gone through one or more 
divorces. Why did their wives choose not to inform the IRS of their husbands’
offshore holdings through the IRS Whistleblower Program?
Imagine if Mr. and Mrs. Manafort were in the process of divorce at the time 
of the FBI raid, and she had learned during the divorce that her husband had 
engaged in tax fraud and evasion. Would she provide information to the IRS and 
under what circumstances? What if Colbie Holderness or Jennie Willoughby 
had discovered during their divorces from Rob Porter that he also was engaging 
in offshore tax fraud and evasion? Should they have a shield from possible joint 
civil and criminal liability given their allegations of abuse? To summarize, the 
main question is the following: Are both the Department of Justice and the IRS 
missing out on an opportunity to impose civil and criminal liability on offshore 
tax evaders by failing to speak with wives during the divorce process? Relatedly, 
what can the United States do to empower wives who learn of offshore tax fraud 
and evasion during divorce proceedings to report the behavior to the IRS?
A. Noncompliance in Divorce & Offshore Tax Reporting
High-net-worth husbands who refuse to comply with the divorce discovery 
process and thus fail to disclose hidden offshore assets (“noncompliant 
spouses”) are by nature also tax frauds and evaders.29 If they were not, their 
wives would not have to hire forensic accountants and file motions to compel to 
discover an accurate financial picture.30 They could simply look at prior and 
current year tax returns. The ability of noncompliant spouses to escape civil and 
criminal liability in the tax arena, despite their bad behavior in the family law 
context, is perplexing.
Under current law, a noncompliant spouse is able to frustrate his wife’s
attempts to discover family assets and accounts by failing to comply with 
discovery.31 However, at the end of the proceedings, there is no mechanism for 
reporting his attendant tax fraud, and he remains eligible for tax amnesty 
programs.32 Moreover, even if he decides to take a gamble and not divulge his 
tax wrongdoing under a tax amnesty program, he will likely escape criminal 
liability by alleging he did not know he had a legal duty to report or to pay tax 
on offshore income and assets, or in other words, that he did not act 
                                                                                                                     
also Ryan Tracy, Meet Randal Quarles, Trump’s Pick to Shake Up the Fed, WALL ST. J.
(July 28, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/meet-randal-quarles-trumps-pick-to-shake-
up-the-fed-1501234201 [https://perma.cc/VS5T-HSHX] (describing Mr. Quarles’s
connection with President Trump). 
29 See Khrista McCarden, Till Offshore Do Us Part: Uncovering Assets Hidden from 
Spouses and Tax Authorities, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 19, 28–29 (2017).
30 See id.; see also infra Part I.
31 See infra Part I.
32 See infra Part I.
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“willfully.”33 The government will bear a heavy burden of proving 
willfulness.34
Even worse, his wife likely will face civil and criminal liability as well 
because of the joint and several liability that attaches with the filing of joint tax 
returns during marriage.35 Her only chance of avoiding this result is to pursue 
innocent spouse relief under section 6015(c) or section 6015(f) of the Internal 
Revenue Code (I.R.C.).36 However, she will face an almost insurmountable 
obstacle because knowledge of the receipt of money not reported to the IRS is 
enough to disqualify her in most cases, regardless if she knew nothing about the 
source of such money or the failure to report it.37
The current mismatch in “knowledge” standards leads to a perverse result. 
A noncompliant spouse may claim that he lacked “knowledge” of tax reporting 
to escape liability.38 Nevertheless, his wife’s mere “knowledge” that money was 
received is enough to disqualify her from innocent spouse relief, i.e., her one 
shield against joint civil and/or criminal liability.39 Ultimately, our current law 
deters wives of noncompliant spouses from sharing information with the IRS 
about hidden offshore assets uncovered during divorce proceedings.40
B. Hold High-Net-Worth Husbands Accountable & Empower Their 
Wives as IRS Whistleblowers
Offshore tax enforcement may be strengthened through high-net-worth 
divorce proceedings by utilizing a two-fold approach. First, we must curtail the 
ability of noncompliant spouses to use tax amnesty programs and assist the 
government and/or the IRS with establishing “willfulness” on the part of such 
offshore tax cheats. Second, we must shield unknowing wives from shared civil 
and criminal liability and thereby empower them to report offshore assets 
discovered during divorce through the IRS Whistleblower Program. 
Unfortunately, innocent spouse relief is difficult to achieve even in this instance 
because of existing inequities and the way judges, including those in Tax Court, 
view financial and other forms of domestic abuse. These misperceptions must 
change.
Part I argues that family law discovery devices should be modified in order 
to impute knowledge of reporting requirements to noncompliant spouses and 
that noncompliant spouses should be ineligible for voluntary disclosure 
programs and delinquent Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts 
(FBAR) procedures and delinquent international information return 
                                                                                                                     
33 See infra Part I.B.
34 See id.
35 See infra Part II.A.
36 I.R.C. §§ 6015(c)(3)(C), (f) (2012); See infra Part II.B.
37 See infra Part II.B–C.
38 Id. 
39 See infra Part II.A.
40 See infra Part II.
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procedures41 that allow taxpayers to avoid criminal prosecution and cap civil 
penalties. Part II examines current challenges facing wives of noncompliant 
spouses in obtaining relief from the joint and several liability that attaches with 
the filing of joint returns during the marriage, or in other words, innocent spouse 
relief. Relatedly, the link between financial abuse and offshore tax evasion is 
explored to argue for extending innocent spouse relief to this group of wives in 
particular. Finally, Part III proposes that innocent spouse relief would enable 
these wives to serve as effective whistleblowers under the IRS Whistleblower 
Program.
This Article’s proposed reform comes at a particularly relevant time. The 
IRS indicated in 2018 that stemming offshore tax evasion remains one of its 
main goals.42 Recent news stories show how widespread offshore dealings are, 
including among the politically prominent.43 They also have revealed that when 
women are empowered to speak out about the misdeeds of men, even those of 
the highest socioeconomic rankings are held accountable for violating the law. 
In addition, recent headlines show that wives of powerful men are not strangers 
to abuse. While Tax Court may not seem like the obvious place for legal reform 
to our notions of domestic abuse, this Article challenges that idea. It sets forth a 
new framework for indemnifying financially abused wives from the offshore 
tax sins of their high-net-worth husbands and thus encouraging them to serve as 
whistleblowers.
II. NONCOMPLIANT SPOUSES IN THE DIVORCE AND OFFSHORE TAX
CONTEXTS*
Given the ease associated with electronically transferring funds to countries 
today, it has become increasingly difficult to uncover assets that have been 
hidden offshore.44 While in recent years there have been numerous efforts to 
combat offshore tax haven abuses—such as heavy penalties and new reporting 
                                                                                                                     
* This Part was originally published as Khrista McCarden, Till Offshore Do Us Part: 
Uncovering Assets Hidden from Spouses and Tax Authorities, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 19
(2017). Reprinted with permission.
41 For purposes of this Article, voluntary disclosure encompasses both the Offshore 
Voluntary Disclosure Program (OVDP) and the delinquent FBAR submission procedures 
and the delinquent international information return submission procedures, which will 
remain open after the 2014 OVDP closure on September 28, 2018. See Closing the 2014 
Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program Frequently Asked Questions and Answers,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/closing-
the-2014-offshore-voluntary-disclosure-program-frequently-asked-questions-and-answers 
[https://perma.cc/L95T-4WX4] (last updated Nov. 30, 2018) [hereinafter Closing the 2014 
OVDP] (addressing the OVDP closing at FAQs 1, 9, and 10); see also infra note 52.
42 See IRS, “Dirty Dozen” News Release, supra note 4.
43 See, e.g., Swaine & Pilkington, supra note 28; Swanson, supra note 7.
44 See HENRY, supra note 3, at 10.
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requirements45—a fundamental problem persists: the IRS does not have the time 
or resources to untangle the intricate maze of corporate structures used by 
wealthy individuals to hide their assets offshore.46 The spouses of wealthy tax 
evaders do. In fact, the scope of divorce cases can far exceed that of federal tax 
investigations because they seek to “map the wealth of the some of the world’s
richest people.”47
The discovery process that is an integral part of divorce proceedings48 is 
conducive to the unraveling of multiple chains of corporate ownership inherent 
in such “offshore planning.” Under I.R.C. § 7201, tax evasion is a felony that 
carries either a fine of up to $250,000, or five years’ imprisonment, or both.49
The three elements of the crime of tax evasion are (1) willfulness, (2) an attempt 
to evade tax, and (3) additional tax due.50
Part I of this Article argues that discovery devices should be modified in 
order to impute knowledge of reporting requirements to a spouse refusing to 
comply with the discovery process—or what is termed a “noncompliant 
spouse”51—given the willfulness standard applies to all three categories of 
                                                                                                                     
45 See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, Essay, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax 
Gap: When Is Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733, 1742–43 
(2010); Bryan C. Skarlatos & Michael Sardar, Taxes and Penalties on Unreported Foreign 
Assets: Who Foots the Bill?, 27 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 83, 108 (2014); see also Oei, supra
note 6, at 674–93 (providing a summary of recent offshore tax enforcement measures, 
including penalties and new information reporting requirements).
46 IRS ADVISORY COUNCIL, GEN. REP. 11 (2011) (explaining there are still perhaps 
millions of noncompliant taxpayers who refuse to voluntarily come into compliance and 
recommending adequate funding for enforcement and compliance efforts by the Internal 
Revenue Service); Craig M. Boise, Breaking Open Offshore Piggybanks: Deferral and the 
Utility of Amnesty, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 667, 701 (2007) (addressing the use of voluntary 
disclosure programs to promote compliance of offshore tax evaders). See generally Itai 
Grinberg, The Battle Over Taxing Offshore Accounts, 60 UCLA L. REV. 304 (2012) 
(detailing the current initiatives used to uncover and tax offshore accounts).
47 Swanson, supra note 7.
48 See KALMAN A. BARSON, INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES FOR 
DETERMINING THE REALITY BEHIND THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (1986) (providing an 
overview of forensic accounting); LARRY RICE & NICK RICE, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO 
DIVORCE PRACTICE: FORMS AND PROCEDURES FOR THE LAWYER 301–531 (5th ed. 2017) 
(discussing discovery in the context of divorce proceedings).
49 This Article focuses on tax evasion under I.R.C. § 7201 (2012). However, the 
potential criminal charges related to tax matters in addition to tax evasion include filing a 
false return, I.R.C. § 7206(1), and failure to file an income tax return, id. § 7203. See
Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program Frequently Asked Questions and Answers 2012,
IRS, https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/offshore-voluntarydisclosure-
program-frequently-asked-questions-and-answers [https://perma.cc/BY3J-EZL7] (describing 
criminal
penalties at FAQ 6).
50 There are two offenses under I.R.C. § 7201: (a) the willful attempt to evade the 
assessment of tax and (b) the willful attempt to evade the payment of tax.
51 A refusal to comply with discovery requests generally results in the filing of one or 
more motions to compel. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a). For purposes of this Article, it is assumed 
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possible consequences for violating tax requirements. It also contends that 
noncompliant spouses in the divorce context should be ineligible for voluntary 
disclosure programs that allow taxpayers to avoid criminal prosecution and cap 
civil penalties.52 Strengthening the tax implications of failing to disclose assets 
in the divorce context would incentivize noncompliant spouses to comply with 
discovery from an early stage in the proceedings. This would lead to two 
benefits: (1) more expedient family court proceedings and (2) more timely and 
accurate reporting of hidden offshore assets of the noncompliant spouse and 
other associated tax evaders.53
A. Hiding Offshore Assets from Spouses and the IRS
There is a predictable pattern in high-net-worth divorce proceedings that 
involves hiding assets from both a spouse and the IRS.54 In fact, it is not unusual 
for a spouse who is hiding money offshore in anticipation of a divorce also to 
hide their assets from the IRS.55 Typically, a wealthy spouse opens an account 
under the name of a shell company in a tax haven country, such as Panama, and 
transfers assets into the company to hide them from their spouse.56 During the 
divorce proceedings, the wealthy spouse can claim that investments are tied up 
                                                                                                                     
that such noncompliant spouses have also refused to comply with the reporting requirements 
outlined herein.
52 The OVDP from prior years was replaced with the 2014 OVDP. There was no
deadline for participating in the OVDP; however, the IRS retained the ability to revise or end 
the program at any point. See Closing the 2014 OVDP, supra note 41. Accordingly, the IRS 
announced the closing of the 2014 OVDP effective September 28, 2018, but the IRS 
indicated there may be future voluntary disclosure programs and began soliciting suggestions 
regarding such future programs. Id. (FAQ 1, 10, and 12). The IRS “streamlined” procedure 
is not discussed here since that program requires a certification that previous failures to 
comply were due to non-willful conduct. I.R.S. News Release IR-2014-73 (June 18, 2014),
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-makes-changes-to-offshore-programs-revisions-ease-
burden-and-help-more-taxpayers-come-into-compliance [https://perma.cc/8RJZ-NESF]. In 
addition, “quiet disclosure” is not discussed since it subjects participants to civil or criminal 
penalties. See Closing the 2014 OVDP, supra note 41 (describing quiet disclosures at FAQ 
8).
53 Oei, supra note 6, at 689–90 (explaining that the United States has been able to gather 
information about additional offenders by using information collected by virtue of its 
offshore voluntary disclosure programs or through what is termed “cascading compliance”).
54 See Swanson, supra note 7.
55 See, e.g., Fred L. Abrams, Divorce & Hidden Money: Whistleblowing, Tax Fraud & 
Tipping the IRS, ASSET SEARCH BLOG (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.assetsearchblog.com/2014/
02/13/divorce-hidden-money-whistleblowingtax-fraud-tipping-the-irs/ [https://perma.cc/3YEW-
AS7L] (recounting a divorce lawyer’s investigation into a husband suspected of hiding assets 
offshore); Jim Zarroli, Want to Set Up a Shell Corporation to Hide Your Millions? No 
Problem, NPR (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.npr.org/2016/04/13/474101127/want-to-set-up-
a-shell-corporation-to-hide-your-millions-no-problem [https://perma.cc/4ZLR-8PGR].
56 Swanson, supra note 7. See generally Zarroli, supra note 55 (“The ease with which 
[shell companies] can be established is one reason more and more money is pouring into 
them each year.”).
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in the sham corporation and then later lost.57 At the same time, the wealthy 
spouse does not report the offshore account to the IRS, as required under the 
FBAR58 and Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act of 2010 (FATCA)59 filing 
requirements and engages in tax evasion.60 For purposes of this Article, such 
spouses are included in the term “noncompliant” spouses.
                                                                                                                     
57 Id.
58 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350 (2018); DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FORM TD F 90-22.1, REPORT 
OF FOREIGN BANK AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS (2012). U.S. persons with an interest or 
signatory authority over a foreign bank or financial account exceeding $10,000 at any point 
during the year are required to file the FBAR electronically. See BSA E-Filing System, FIN.
CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, https://bsaefiling.fincen.treas.gov/main.html [https://perma.cc/ZB
7U-GLUK]. 
59 Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, 124 Stat. 72 (2010) 
(codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 1471–1474 (2012)).
60 I.R.S. News Release IR-2015-86 (June 10, 2015), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/tax
payers-with-foreign-assets-may-have-fbar-and-fatca-filing-requirements-in-june 
[https://perma.cc/DBF8-VBRF] [hereinafter IRS, “Taxpayers with Foreign Assets” News
Release]; Steven Toscher & Michel R. Stein, FBAR Enforcement Is Coming!, 5 J. TAX PRAC.
& PROC. 27, 29 (2003); Joanna Heiberg, Note, FATCA: Toward a Multilateral Automatic 
Information Reporting Regime, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1685, 1698–99 (2012). For 
purposes of this Article, voluntary disclosure also encompasses the delinquent FBAR 
submission procedures and the delinquent international information return submission 
procedures, which will remain open after the 2014 OVDP temporarily closes on September 
28, 2018. Closing the 2014 OVDP, supra note 41. Taxpayers who do not need “to file 
delinquent or amended tax returns to report and pay additional tax,” contrary to those using 
the OVDP or the Streamlined Filing Compliance Procedures, may use the submission 
procedures noted provided they meet certain requirements. Delinquent FBAR Submission 
Procedures, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-
taxpayers/delinquent-fbar-submission-procedures [https://perma.cc/8PCY-MZVJ] (last 
updated July 18, 2018) (explaining that taxpayers are eligible if they “have not filed a 
required . . . [FBAR], are not under a civil examination or criminal investigation by the IRS, 
and have not already been contacted by the IRS about the delinquent FBARs”); Delinquent 
International Information Return Submission Procedures, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/delinquent-international-
information-return-submission-procedures [https://perma.cc/DMH9-5YS3] (last updated 
June 18, 2018) (explaining that taxpayers are eligible if they “have not filed one or more 
required international information returns, have reasonable cause for not timely filing the 
information returns, are not under a civil examination or a criminal investigation by the IRS, 
and have not already been contacted by the IRS about the delinquent information returns”). 
Notably, the IRS criminal investigation voluntary disclosure program will remain open after 
September 28, 2018 as well. I.R.S. News Release IR-2018-52 (Mar. 13, 2018), 
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-to-end-offshore-voluntary-disclosure-program-taxpayers
-with-undisclosed-foreign-assets-urged-to-come-forward-now [https://perma.cc/2W24-
UJYM].
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1. Family Law Discovery Process and Tracing Offshore Assets
Generally, family lawyers attempt to use the discovery process, where 
documents must be exchanged by court order, to gather financial and other 
information.61 Although some hidden foreign assets are uncovered through an 
extensive court discovery process, the process inevitably is incomplete.62 A
family lawyer often must resort to filing motions to compel.63 Even in 
responding to these motions to compel, a truly recalcitrant spouse will continue 
to fail to disclose assets and provide incomplete or inaccurate information.64
Ultimately, the family lawyer must subpoena financial documents of any known 
bank or other financial accounts.65
After obtaining documents through a subpoena, or less likely cooperation 
from the noncompliant spouse, a family lawyer conducts a review to determine 
whether any assets have mysteriously disappeared.66 Generally, the other 
spouse must resort to hiring one or more forensic accountants that will trace 
assets and liabilities in order to uncover hidden offshore assets.67 Forensic 
accountants also rely on document review to conduct such tracing.68 In fact, it 
is not uncommon to learn there are 100 people in twenty countries delving into 
a secret world of offshore intricacies accessible only to the wealthiest 
                                                                                                                     
61 See 2 VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY § 29.04 (2005) (first 
quoting Ronnkvist v. Ronnkvist, 331 N.W.2d 764, 765–66 (Minn. 1983) (“[P]arties to a 
marital dissolution proceeding have a duty to make a full and accurate disclosure of all assets 
and liabilities to facilitate the trial court’s property distribution.”) and then quoting Rothman 
v. Rothman, 320 A.2d 496, 503–04 (N.J. 1974) (stating that the trial judge must insist upon 
“full cooperation of the litigants” in a divorce proceeding to effectuate equitable distribution 
of marital property) (explaining that almost every equitable distribution and community 
property state recognizes the need for financial discovery)).
62 See id. § 29.04[2] (noting that the initial step is document disclosure and that a single 
demand may not be adequate).
63 See RICE & RICE, supra note 48, at 306.
64 See Darlys S. Harmon-Vaught, Techniques for Discovering Hidden Assets and 
Unreported Income During the Divorce Process, ASS’N DIVORCE FIN. PLANNERS (June 15, 
2014), https://www.divorceandfinance.org/news/284737/Techniques-for-Discovering-Hidden-Ass
ets-and-Unreported-Income-During-the-Divorce-Process.htm [https://perma.cc/82VH-574S] 
(addressing the large cost of investigation). See generally BARSON, supra note 48 (providing 
an overview of forensic accounting).
65 Id.
66 Marlene Moses & Beth A. Townsend, Family Matters: Uncovering Hidden Assets in 
Divorce, 48 TENN. B.J. 25, 26 (2012).
67 See generally Brigitte W. Muehlmann et al., The Use of Forensic Accounting Experts 
in Tax Cases as Identified in Court Opinions, 4 J. FORENSIC & INVESTIGATIVE ACCT., no. 2, 
2012, at 1 (analyzing the use of forensic accounting experts in federal and state courts).
68 See Andrew S. Grossman, Avoiding Legal Malpractice in Family Law Cases: The 
Dangers of Not Engaging in Financial Discovery, 33 FAM. L.Q. 361, 376 (1999); Rebecca 
E. Hatch, Uncovering Marital Assets in Divorce Proceedings, 128 AM. JUR. TRIALS § 33
(2013).
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individuals.69 Their main objective is to unravel a web of company ownership 
that leads back to the wealthy instigator of it all, i.e., the beneficial owner.70
Their work is frustrated by noncompliant spouses who refuse to turn over 
documents or financial information. The requests for these documents are often 
ignored or completed only partially.71
After the noncompliant spouse’s hidden assets are uncovered in the family 
law setting, the assets become subject to tax related penalties, which include 
criminal liability or civil penalties.72 Although the other spouse may qualify for 
innocent spouse relief in theory, there are substantial roadblocks under the 
current provisions, which are discussed in Part II.73
2. Current Tax Consequences of Noncompliant Spouses
Once hidden assets are disclosed during divorce proceedings, the most 
important issue in the tax context becomes whether a noncompliant spouse 
“willfully” failed to report their foreign assets.74 This is because a willful failure 
could result in criminal prosecution or enormous civil penalties as discussed 
more fully in this section.75 Moreover, new reporting laws, such as FATCA, 
require foreign financial institutions (FFIs) around the globe to report bank 
accounts held by U.S. customers to the IRS.76 While these new reporting laws 
make it easier for the IRS, creditors, and spouses to find hidden foreign 
accounts, strengthening the consequences of failing to comply with these tax 
reporting laws and requirements in the context of divorce proceedings would 
result in more timely and accurate disclosure as well as locating additional 
offenders.77
Currently, even after hidden foreign assets have come to light during 
divorce proceedings, there are too many ways for a noncompliant spouse to 
mitigate the tax consequences of their bad behavior. Most importantly, the IRS 
will rely on voluntary disclosure in determining whether to criminally 
                                                                                                                     
69 Swanson, supra note 7.
70 Id.
71 See Moses & Townsend, supra note 66, at 27–28. See generally Samuel V. 
Schoonmaker, III et al., Hauling Foreign Assets and Income into U.S. Courts, 15 FAM.
ADVOC. 46 (1993) (describing the difficulties associated with discovering assets hidden 
abroad); Sanjay T. Tailor, Better Civil Practice in Dissolution of Marriage Litigation, 40 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 911 (2009) (discussing the difficulty of discovery during the divorce 
process).
72 See infra notes 98–101 and accompanying text.
73 Skarlatos & Sardar, supra note 45, at 108; see infra Part.II.
74 See I.R.C. § 7201 (2012).
75 See infra notes 98–101 and accompanying text.
76 FATCA, enacted in 2010 as part of the HIRE Act requires U.S. persons to report 
specified foreign assets to the IRS on Form 8938 pursuant to I.R.C. § 6038D and FFIs to 
report U.S. customers to the IRS. See I.R.C. §§ 1471–1474.
77 See Oei, supra note 6, at 731–32.
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prosecute.78 Voluntary disclosure takes place when in a manner that is truthful, 
timely, and complete, the taxpayer (a) evinces a willingness to cooperate 
followed by such cooperation with the IRS to determine accurate tax liability 
and (b) engages in a good faith effort to satisfy in full applicable tax, interest, 
and penalties.79 Often, as stated above, the noncompliant spouse never chooses 
to reveal these assets. They are only uncovered through a family lawyer’s use 
of motions to compel and subpoenas and through the hiring of forensic 
accountants.80 Once tax fraud is apparent in divorce proceedings, the judge may 
report the fraud to the IRS.81 In a 2004 New York case, for example, a judge 
reported a husband to the IRS after an admission that he had not paid taxes.82
However, a spouse who has remained noncompliant over the course of 
several years of divorce proceedings will only be subject to criminal prosecution 
or to civil penalties if willfulness is shown.83 Currently, the discovery process 
enables noncompliant spouses to claim their failure to report hidden foreign 
assets was not willful.84 This Article proposes that discovery documents should 
include statements of reporting requirements to prevent a noncompliant spouse 
from getting away with tax fraud with little or no ramifications. In addition, such 
noncompliant spouses are still eligible to participate in voluntary disclosure 
programs85 or delinquent FBAR procedures and delinquent international 
information return procedures.86 This Article contends that family lawyers 
should be able to report noncompliant spouses who meet certain thresholds to 
the IRS so that they will become ineligible for pre-clearance for voluntary 
                                                                                                                     
78 See IRM 9.5.11.9(1) (Dec. 2, 2009).
79 See IRM 9.5.11.9(3). For the requirements applicable for the delinquent FBAR and 
international information return submission procedures, see supra note 60.
80 See supra notes 54–73 and accompanying text.
81 Abrams, supra note 59.
82 See Hashimoto v. De La Rosa, No. 350155/04, 2004 WL 2187595, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. June 23, 2004); see also Beth M. v. Joseph M., 203398/2001, 2006 WL 2128157, at *15 
n.4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 25, 2006) (stating that husband was reported to IRS after admitting 
he failed to file tax returns for 1997–2001 and other years).
83 See Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499–500 (1943) (holding that willfulness 
requires a specific intent or active desire to engage in tax evasion); see also United States v. 
Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 513 (1942) (holding that tax evasion conviction requires proof that 
defendant acted willfully); Elwert v. United States, 231 F.2d 928, 932–33 (9th Cir. 1956) 
(stating taxpayer’s acting with specific intent to defraud must be shown).
84 See Skarlatos & Sardar, supra note 45.
85 See Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program Frequently Asked Questions and 
Answers 2012, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-
taxpayers/offshore-voluntary-disclosure-program-frequently-asked-questions-and-answers
[https://perma.cc/BY3J-EZL7] (describing eligible participants for voluntary disclosure at 
FAQ 12).
86 See supra note 60 (stating that voluntary disclosure is deemed to include delinquent 
FBAR and international information return submission procedures for purposes of this 
Article).
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disclosure programs.87 The following section briefly outlines the reporting 
requirements for foreign assets that a noncompliant spouse would have failed to 
fulfill during the divorce proceedings and likely in prior years.
3. Offshore Reporting Requirements
Since the United States has a worldwide system of taxation for individuals, 
all U.S. citizens and residents are required to report worldwide income, 
regardless of whether such income is earned abroad.88 U.S. taxpayers may use 
a foreign tax credit or a foreign income exclusion to prevent double taxation 
largely.89 Moreover, U.S. taxpayers have a legal duty to report their ownership 
interest in foreign assets, e.g., foreign accounts and foreign entities, such as 
corporations, partnerships, and trusts.90 Finally, under a separate reporting 
obligation, U.S. taxpayers are required to file a FBAR with the Treasury 
Department for each foreign financial account that has a balance over $10,000 
at any time during the taxable year.91 An unreported foreign account may result 
in the imposition of huge penalties that may far exceed the value of the 
unreported account.92 Foreign asset reporting obligations are complex and 
require reporting the same foreign asset in multiple ways at times.93 To 
summarize, all foreign income and the majority of foreign assets must be 
reported in the United States even if earned or kept abroad.94 There are three 
                                                                                                                     
87 A taxpayer can become ineligible for the OVDP if the IRS receives information 
pertinent to their undisclosed OVDP assets while a hypothetical question (e.g., from his/her 
attorney) is pending. See Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program Frequently Asked 
Questions and Answers 2012, supra note 85 (FAQ 22).
88 I.R.C. § 61 (2012); Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 56 (1924); Ruth Mason, Citizenship 
Taxation, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 169, 172 (2016).
89 I.R.C. §§ 901, 911.
90 See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SCHEDULE B (FORM 1040): INTEREST AND 
ORDINARY DIVIDENDS (2018); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 5471: INFORMATION 
RETURN OF U.S. PERSONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN FOREIGN CORPORATIONS (2018);
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 3520: ANNUAL RETURN TO REPORT TRANSACTIONS WITH 
FOREIGN TRUSTS AND RECEIPT OF CERTAIN FOREIGN GIFTS (2018); INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., FORM 3520-A: ANNUAL INFORMATION RETURN OF FOREIGN TRUST WITH A U.S.
OWNER (2018); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 8865: RETURN OF U.S. PERSONS WITH 
RESPECT TO CERTAIN FOREIGN PARTNERSHIPS (2018); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 
8938: STATEMENT OF SPECIFIED FOREIGN FINANCIAL ASSETS (2018).
91 See 31 U.S.C. § 5314 (2012); 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350 (2012). The FBAR is filed on 
Form 114 with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), a division of the 
Treasury Department. IRS, “Taxpayers with Foreign Assets” News Release, supra note 60.
92 Skarlatos & Sardar, supra note 45, at 103.
93 Id. at 85. 
94 Id. For a complete discussion of the tax return reporting requirements and related 
penalties, see id. at 85–93.
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possible categories of consequence for failure to comply: (1) criminal 
conviction;95 (2) a 50% FBAR penalty;96 and (3) a 75% civil tax fraud penalty.97
B. Willful Violation Equals Three Possible Penalties
Once an IRS agent, a prosecutor, or a court determines that a noncompliant 
spouse has acted willfully in failing to meet reporting requirements, the spouse
is subject to criminal prosecution or enormous tax and FBAR penalties.98 In 
fact, willfulness is the standard for all three categories of penalties to which a 
noncompliant spouse may be subject: (1) criminal conviction;99 (2) a 50% 
FBAR penalty;100 and (3) a 75% civil tax fraud penalty.101 As a result, proving 
willfulness is the key to strengthening the implications of failure to comply with 
reporting requirements.102 Although the Department of Justice’s Offshore 
Compliance Initiative (OCI) has been advertised as a top litigation priority of 
the Tax Division, as of July 2016, it has only resulted in indictments of 117 
taxpayers with offshore accounts and nineteen guilty verdicts overall according 
to one tax blog.103
                                                                                                                     
95 I.R.C. § 7201 (2012). 
96 If a taxpayer can prove reasonable cause for failing to file an FBAR, e.g., the taxpayer 
told a tax preparer who neglected to file the FBAR about the foreign account(s), no penalty 
will be imposed. See IRM § 4.26.16.4.11 (Nov. 6, 2015). However, if the taxpayer cannot 
prove reasonable cause for failing to file an FBAR, a non-willful violation of the FBAR 
reporting requirement may result in a civil penalty up to $10,000 if it occurred after October 
22, 2004. 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(B) (2012); see also Matthew A. Melone, Penalties for the 
Failure to Report Foreign Financial Accounts and the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 337, 346, 358 (2015).
97 See I.R.C. § 6663(a); 1 ROBERT S. FINK ET AL., TAX CONTROVERSIES: AUDITS,
INVESTIGATIONS, TRIALS § 17.03 (Lexis/Nexis, 35th ed., 2016); Offshore Credit Card 
Accounts Are Sometimes Financial Accounts for Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts 
Reporting, 20 J. TAX’N & REG. FIN. INST. 38 (2006).
98 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX CRIMES HANDBOOK 2 (2009), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/tax_crimes_handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/LJE9-WF4D] 
[hereinafter TAX CRIMES HANDBOOK]. 
99 Regarding criminal conviction, the government must show the taxpayer willfully 
failed to report a foreign asset. Skarlatos & Sardar, supra note 45, at 93; see also Spies v. 
United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 (1942).
100 See 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(B); IRM § 4.26.16.4.11.
101 Regarding the 75% penalty, the government must show the taxpayer willfully under-
reported his/her income tax. See supra note 82; see also Skarlatos & Sardar, supra note 45,
at 93.
102 See, e.g., Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 353 (1965) (“Given petitioner’s
material misstatement which resulted in a tax deficiency, if, as the jury obviously found, 
petitioner’s act was willful in the sense that he knew that he should have reported more 
income than he did for the year 1957, he was guilty of violating both §§ 7201 and 7207. If 
his action was not willful, he was guilty of violating neither.”).
103 Jack Townsend, Offshore Charges: Convictions Spreadsheet, FED. TAX CRIMES (July 
22, 2016), http://federaltaxcrimes.blogspot.com/p/offshore-charges-convictions.html 
[https://perma.cc/8U8C-BBX6]. 
538 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 80:3
The only difference in terms of the willfulness standard that applies to each 
penalty category is the level of proof required. For a criminal conviction, the 
level of proof is “beyond a reasonable doubt” whereas for the civil FBAR or 
civil fraud penalty cases, the level of proof is “clear and convincing.”104 If the 
government has large amounts of evidence that the taxpayer acted willfully in 
failing to report a foreign asset, it will have an easier time meeting the higher 
burden of showing willfulness “beyond a reasonable doubt.”105 However, if the 
government does not have much evidence of willfulness or the taxpayer is able 
to offer cogent excuses, then the government may only be able to meet the “clear 
and convincing” standard of proof and will not be able to seek a criminal 
charge.106
C. Using Family Law Discovery Devices to Prove Willfulness
There are a number of factors that establish willfulness, and the devices used 
in the divorce discovery process should be modified to make proving willfulness 
easier.107 The definition of willfulness is “an intentional violation of a known 
legal duty.”108 A taxpayer who knows they should report a foreign asset, but 
intentionally refuses to do so, has acted willfully.109 The problem is that 
ignorance of the law may be used as a defense in this context.110 In other words, 
a taxpayer may claim that he or she did not know there was a legal requirement 
to disclose a foreign asset, and as a result, willfulness cannot be proven.111
In light of the definition for willfulness, the discovery process should 
embody informing a noncompliant spouse of the legal duty to disclose foreign 
assets through complying with offshore reporting requirements. Once a 
noncompliant spouse has provable knowledge of offshore reporting 
requirements, if the other spouse still refuses to comply, willfulness would be 
easily established by the government.112 At that point, the noncompliant spouse 
                                                                                                                     
104 Steven Toscher & Lacey Strachan, Proving Willfulness in an FBAR Case, 14 J. TAX 
PRAC. & PROC. 29, 29 (2012).
105 See Skarlatos & Sardar, supra note 45, at 94.
106 See id. 
107 The concept of “willful blindness” also applies to “willfulness.” However, this 
standard is more difficult to prove since it involves conjecture about a person’s thoughts
when the tax return was filed. Id. at 94–95. Accordingly, this Article will focus upon 
imputing knowledge to the noncompliant spouse so that the government’s burden of proof 
required for establishing willfulness may be met more easily.
108 Criminal tax offenses are specific intent crimes. The intent required is “willfulness,”
i.e., an “intentional violation of a known legal duty.” Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 
196 (1991); United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 22 (1976).
109 A willful failure to file requires a failure that is voluntary, purposeful, deliberate, and 
intentional, as distinct from merely accidental, inadvertent, or negligent. Sawyer v. United 
States, 607 F.2d 1190, 1192 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943 (1980).
110 Cheek, 498 U.S. at 199–200.
111 See id.
112 See id. at 202.
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would have intentionally violated a known legal duty, which is the very 
definition of willfulness.113
1. Imputing Knowledge Through Discovery Devices
There are several discovery devices that could be used to impute knowledge 
to a noncompliant spouse and thus help the government meet its burden of proof 
in showing a willful violation. As stated earlier, noncompliant spouses are able 
to claim a lack of knowledge of reporting requirements after having been served 
with numerous requests for financial documents during the divorce discovery 
process.114 As discussed earlier, family lawyers often must rely on subpoenas,
motions to compel, and the work of forensic accountants to gain a full picture 
of assets, especially those that have been hidden offshore in anticipation of
divorce.115 Only through the expenditure of much time and money are the 
hidden assets brought to light.116 The noncompliant spouse who has refused to 
disclose assets at every turn can escape both criminal liability and civil penalties, 
which require a showing of willfulness, simply by claiming they had no 
knowledge of reporting requirements.
This stark reality begs an important question: Why not include in discovery 
requests statements that will impute knowledge of reporting requirements to 
such noncompliant spouses? Following is a discussion of how certain discovery 
devices, namely (1) interrogatories, (2) requests for production of documents, 
and (3) depositions could be used in this manner and thus alleviate the 
government’s burden in proving willfulness in a criminal prosecution or in 
assessing civil penalties.117 The threat of successful criminal prosecution or the 
imposition of huge civil penalties should encourage noncompliant spouses to 
comply with discovery and reveal hidden assets to the tax authorities.118
First, interrogatories may be used to impute knowledge of the legal duty to 
report hidden foreign assets to the IRS. Interrogatories are written questions sent 
to a party (the “answering party”) that are responded to in writing under oath 
and then remitted to the sender.119 Interrogatories may require the answering 
party to provide “papers, documents or photographs” that are relevant in 
responding.120 Interrogatories should include a straightforward statement of the 
                                                                                                                     
113 See id. at 201.
114 See supra Part I.A.2.
115 See supra Part I.A.1.
116 Harmon-Vaught, supra note 64 (discussing methods for uncovering hidden assets 
that can “present a seemingly insurmountable wall” of difficulty for those trying to foil 
them).
117 See VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY, supra note 61,
§ 29.04[6] (listing, in addition to an initial document demand, other appraisal devices, 
including oral depositions and interrogatories).
118 See Abrams, supra note 55.
119 Hatch, supra note 68, § 36.
120 Id. § 34.
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legal duty to report hidden foreign assets to the IRS by reference to specific 
forms and schedules. Once the answering party is served with the 
interrogatories, the party has knowledge of such legal duty. If the answering 
party is a noncompliant spouse, the government can easily meet its burden of 
proving willfulness and subsequently seek criminal prosecution.121 A warning 
to that effect could also be included with the interrogatories. This would 
incentivize potential noncompliant spouses to disclose hidden foreign assets 
both to the IRS and to their spouse.
Second, requests for production of documents may be used in a similar 
manner to provide inescapable knowledge of the legal duty to disclose hidden 
foreign assets. After a family law action commences, a party may request 
documents or other items in the possession, custody, or control of the other party 
or a person served with a notice or subpoena.122 This is referred to as a request 
for production of documents.123 Noncompliant spouses refuse to comply with 
these requests, which leads to unnecessary prolonging of the divorce 
proceedings.124 At the same time, noncompliant spouses also fail to disclose 
information ascertainable from the documents they are hiding to the IRS in 
violation of reporting requirements. The noncompliant spouse “willfully”
abuses the discovery process and should also be deemed to “willfully” violate 
IRS reporting obligations.125 To achieve a more fair result, requests for 
production of documents, as with interrogatories, should include a statement of 
reporting requirements that references specific forms and schedules.126
Third, depositions, which involve oral examination of a party, also serve as 
a keen opportunity to impute knowledge that in turn will make willfulness easier 
to prove.127 A deposition notice may also include the requirement of producing 
documents or other items at the oral examination.128 Documents turned over 
during the deposition may be marked as exhibits and used during the 
examination.129 However, typically, financial documents are requested before 
the taking of the deposition.130 The family lawyer taking the deposition of a 
noncompliant spouse (who has refused to provide documents) could begin the 
                                                                                                                     
121 See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 196 (1990).
122 Hatch, supra note 68, § 34.
123 Id.
124 See Aaron Thomas, When Your Spouse Won’t Provide Financial Information: 
Motion to Compel Divorce Discovery, LAWYERS.COM, https://www.lawyers.com/legal-
info/family-law/divorce/when-your-spouse-wont-provide-financial-information-motion-to-
compel-divorce-discovery.html [https://perma.cc/U4DY-V6SM].
125 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 2023.010(g), 2023.030(d) (West 2007); see also In 
re Marriage of Eustice, 195 Cal. Rptr. 3d 876, 889 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (noting that ex-
husband engaged in “willful discovery abuse” by refusing to produce discovery documents 
for over two and a half years which resulted in the unavailability of material evidence).
126 See supra text accompanying notes 58–60.
127 Hatch, supra note 68, § 38.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 See RICE & RICE, supra note 48, at 389. 
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deposition by reading a short uniform statement of reporting requirements.131
Since depositions are transcribed by a stenographer,132 a deposition transcript 
could be given to the government to enable it to meet its burden of proof in a 
criminal prosecution once the compliant spouse is able to determine some of the 
hidden assets through other means, i.e., has impeached statements made during 
the deposition.133
2. Willfulness in the FBAR Context
An examination of how courts have recently analyzed willfulness in the 
FBAR context bolsters the argument presented. In United States v. Williams,134
the Fourth Circuit reversed the lower court’s ruling and held that the taxpayer 
did in fact willfully fail to file FBARs, which resulted in the imposition of FBAR 
civil penalties.135 In making its decision, the Circuit Court relied on three 
principles, the first of which is particularly relevant for these purposes: conduct 
designed to conceal income or additional financial information can establish 
willfulness.136 Regarding this principle, the Court noted that the taxpayer stated 
on a tax return worksheet from his accountant that he did not have a foreign 
bank account.137 The Court determined this was evidence of conduct designed 
to conceal income and used it to impose FBAR penalties against him.138
More than likely, obtaining a tax return worksheet from a noncompliant 
spouse would be a difficult task and probably require a subpoena of the tax 
accountant. Also, the Court had to rely heavily upon Williams’ guilty plea, i.e., 
admission that he failed to report foreign accounts to the IRS or the Treasury 
Department as part of an intricate tax scheme.139 Requiring a guilty plea to 
establish willfulness restricts the ability of courts to impose civil FBAR 
penalties and is more than likely not a common occurrence.140 A noncompliant 
spouse’s refusal to turn over information regarding foreign assets should already 
                                                                                                                     
131 Cf. id. at 303 (explaining that reading the perjury statute at the beginning of the 
deposition and the penalty for perjury is an effective technique for obtaining more truthful 
depositions).
132 See id. at 393.
133 See TAX CRIMES HANDBOOK, supra note 98, at 9.
134 United States v. Williams, 489 F. App’x 655 (4th Cir. 2012).
135 Id. at 659–60.
136 See id.
137 Id.; see also Aruna Viswanatha et al., Manafort Accountant Testifies Tax Returns 
Contained False Information, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ma
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138 Williams, 489 F. App’x at 659–60. 
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140 See Robert Hanson, Willful “Blindness” and Willful FBAR Penalties (Mar. 1, 2017),
https://www.irsmedic.com/blog/2017/03/the-2017-state-of-the-law-on-willful-fbar-penaltie
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be deemed evidence of conduct designed to conceal income.141 A more direct 
way of establishing a noncompliant spouse’s willfulness in the FBAR context 
would be to include statements of foreign asset/income reporting requirements 
on the discovery devices mentioned.
In cases involving a noncompliant spouse, the government should be able 
to point to the noncompliant spouse’s behavior during discovery to establish 
willfulness instead of having to rely on finding a tax worksheet given to an 
accountant and a guilty plea. A noncompliant spouse’s behavior by its nature is 
conduct designed to conceal income.142 That is why motions to compel and 
subpoenas must be used to obtain any documents; even in the face of motions 
to compel and subpoenas, noncompliant spouses persist on concealing their 
income, which should satisfy the standard set forth in Williams. However, to 
make the willfulness even clearer, the discovery devices should include 
statements of reporting requirements. Including such statements of reporting 
requirements would make it even easier for the government to prove that a 
noncompliant spouse has acted willfully in failing to report hidden foreign 
assets. The government need only point to the statements of reporting 
requirements contained in the interrogatories, requests for documents, etc. The 
noncompliant spouse’s decision to ignore written statements of reporting 
requirements contained in discovery requests would enable the government to 
show willfulness and thus impose civil FBAR penalties under Williams.
In another case that resulted in the imposition of FBAR penalties, United 
States v. McBride,143 the taxpayer was held to have willfully failed to file 
FBARs due to certain egregious actions, including describing his offshore 
structuring as tax evasion himself.144 Because McBride had signed his income 
tax returns, knowledge of the FBAR reporting requirement was imputed to 
him.145 However, his failure to comply with the legal duty to file the FBAR was 
deemed either “reckless or due to willful blindness.”146 The court then had to 
find that recklessness is adequate to show willfulness in terms of imposing a 
civil FBAR penalty.147 If a court is not willing to make the same determination 
regarding “willfulness,” a noncompliant spouse could escape civil FBAR 
penalties and escape any meaningful financial consequences despite his/her 
deliberate concealing of assets over the course of a multi-year divorce 
                                                                                                                     
141 See Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499 (1942) (noting that conduct likely to 
conceal or mislead constitutes an affirmative act of evasion, and in contrast to a passive 
failure to file, may serve as the basis a tax evasion conviction); see also United States v. 
Williams, 489 F. App’x 655, 659 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding that false answers regarding tax 
documents are “meant to conceal or mislead sources of income” and constitute willful 
blindness to FBAR requirements). 
142 See supra Part I.C.
143 United States v. McBride, 908 F. Supp. 2d 1186 (D. Utah 2012).
144 Id. at 1206.
145 See id. at 1212–13, 1214.
146 See id. at 1212–13.
147 Id. at 1204–05.
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proceeding. A better course of action is to include statements of reporting 
requirements in discovery devices and impute to the noncompliant spouse 
knowledge of such requirements. Although Williams and McBride deal with 
willfulness in the FBAR civil penalty context, there is no reason why willfulness 
could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the standard required for 
criminal prosecution. The potential exposure to criminal liability should serve 
as a deterrent to a continued failure to cooperate with the discovery process and 
to continue to violate reporting requirements throughout divorce proceedings.148
D. Removing the Possibility of Voluntary Disclosure for Noncompliant 
Spouses
A taxpayer who has failed to disclose foreign assets may participate in what 
is known as a voluntary disclosure program in order to escape criminal liability 
and to prevent at least some civil penalties.149 There are four requirements for 
participation in the offshore voluntary disclosure program: (1) a “timely”
disclosure; (2) undisclosed income or assets that were legally derived; (3) 
truthful cooperation with requests for information; and (4) payment or a good 
faith arrangement to pay taxes, penalties, and interest owing.150 The first two
requirements are threshold requirements.151 This Article assumes that the 
offshore assets have been legally derived.
1. Current Pre-Clearance Procedure
“Timely” means that the noncompliant spouse is not already subject to an 
IRS investigation or audit.152 If the IRS has already started an investigation or 
audit, the noncompliant spouse is ineligible for the voluntary disclosure 
program.153 A “pre-clearance” procedure enables taxpayers to determine 
whether there is an IRS investigation or audit underway before disclosing the 
unreported assets.154 The taxpayer is required to send the IRS Criminal 
Investigation Division a letter identifying, inter alia, himself/herself and any 
financial institution that holds unreported assets.155 The IRS then runs a check 
                                                                                                                     
148 See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169, 176 (1968) (“Practically all the diverse theories agree . . . an increase in a 
person’s probability of conviction or punishment if convicted would generally decrease, 
perhaps substantially, perhaps negligibly, the number of offenses he commits.”).
149 Skarlatos & Sardar, supra note 45, at 103–06.
150 See Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program Frequently Asked Questions and 
Answers 2012, supra note 85 (describing the program’s requirements at FAQ 7); Skarlatos 
& Sardar, supra note 45, at 103.
151 Skarlatos & Sardar, supra note 45, at 103–04.
152 IRM 9.5.11.9(4) (Dec. 2, 2009).
153 See id.
154 See Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program Frequently Asked Questions and 
Answers 2012, supra note 85 (discussing the preclearance procedure at FAQ 23).
155 Id. (stating the required disclosures at FAQ 25).
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against a list of taxpayers whom the IRS or the Department of Justice has 
previously identified and will then inform the taxpayer whether they are “pre-
cleared” and therefore may make a disclosure.156 In most cases, a noncompliant 
spouse would need to request pre-clearance before making a disclosure.157
2. Proposed Ineligibility for Pre-Clearance
Instead of allowing noncompliant spouses an opportunity to enter a 
voluntary disclosure program after evading the discovery process for prolonged 
periods of time,158 there should be a shortened window for these taxpayers. 
Once a motion to compel has been filed against a noncompliant spouse and has 
either remained pending for a given period, e.g., six months or longer or has 
been granted, and the other spouse can prove an offshore connection in the form 
of (1) at least one known foreign account (whether disclosed or not); (2) prior 
offshore business activity; or (3) frequent trips abroad, the noncompliant 
spouse’s name should be added to a separate list that makes them ineligible for 
the disclosure program if the noncompliant spouse does not make a disclosure 
within a prescribed time frame, e.g., ninety days. By giving the noncompliant 
spouse a deadline for starting the disclosure process that works in tandem with 
the discovery process timeline, the IRS can assist with the uncovering of hidden 
assets and promote compliance with reporting requirements, which ultimately 
will generate more revenue in the form of taxes, penalties, and interest from the 
noncompliant spouse and additional offenders.
Allowing a noncompliant spouse the opportunity to mitigate criminal 
liability and civil penalties easily through entering a voluntary disclosure 
program leads to an unjust result. The discovery process is unnecessarily 
prolonged, and accurate reporting is unnecessarily delayed by enabling 
noncompliant spouses to face only minor consequences for failing to comply. 
Such flagrant disregard of the family law discovery process and reporting 
requirements should not go unreprimanded. The solution is to add statements of 
reporting requirements to discovery devices to enable the government to prove 
willfulness and to allow family lawyers dealing with noncompliant spouses to 
have their names added to the list the IRS uses to determine ineligibility for 
voluntary disclosure pre-clearance. These two changes will serve as a powerful 
disincentive for continued noncompliance and will result in more expedient 
divorce proceedings and greater compliance with reporting requirements. 
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III. THE UNJUST DENIAL OF INNOCENT SPOUSE RELIEF FOR WIVES OF 
NONCOMPLIANT SPOUSES
The next step that must be confronted is what happens to the compliant 
spouse who has uncovered the hidden assets during the divorce process. Since 
joint and several liability attaches with the filing of joint tax returns, such 
spouse, typically the wife,159 will also face the possibility of civil and criminal 
liability unless she obtains innocent spouse relief under section 6015.160 The 
mismatch of requiring willfulness to criminally convict the noncompliant 
spouse while allowing mere “knowledge” of the receipt of income (not even the 
source) to eviscerate the ability of his wife to obtain federal innocent spouse 
relief leads to a perverse result. Our current law disincentivizes wives of 
noncompliant spouses from disclosing the offshore assets and accounts 
unearthed in dissolution proceedings through forensic accountants and 
investigative accounting.
Granted, there are two additional avenues that a wife in this circumstance 
could use, but neither is as complete and thus neither would incentivize 
whistleblowing. First, the wife could avail herself of other statutory relief 
provisions.161 However, these forms of relief generally involve an assessment 
of liability against the wife and a later acknowledgment of her inability to pay 
in full at the time.162 A wife would be unlikely to run the risk that the IRS would 
assess total tax liability to her and thus dissuaded from whistleblowing.163
Second, a wife who is unable to receive federal mitigation could request that the 
other spouse contribute toward the tax liability and seek relief under state law.164
Nevertheless, this is not a viable solution if the noncompliant husband is 
judgment proof, and a ruling on the state level could require her to pay.165
Part II argues that the United States must provide wives of noncompliant 
spouses with at least federal innocent spouse relief to encourage them to whistle 
blow about offshore tax evasion uncovered during dissolution proceedings. It 
also concludes that this is in most cases an equitable result because such wives 
typically would not have participated in or known about the wrongdoing of their 
                                                                                                                     
159 See infra Part II.B.1.
160 I.R.C. § 6015 (2012). 
161 These provisions include economic hardship, I.R.C. § 6343(a)(1)(D); Treas. Reg. 
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spouses. Had they known of the unreported income, they would not have needed 
to hire forensic accountants to engage in investigative accounting.
First, it explains the problem of civil and criminal liability that attaches with 
the filing of a joint tax return. Second, it provides a summary of innocent spouse 
relief, with a particular focus on relief under section 6015(c), which is available 
for spouses no longer married, and under section 6015(f), the equitable relief 
provision. Third, it then addresses the current challenges facing wives of 
noncompliant spouses in obtaining such relief and examines relevant omitted 
income cases. Fourth, it argues that the legislative history of innocent spouse 
relief supports extending innocent spouse relief to wives of noncompliant 
spouses. Fifth, a reform of innocent spouse relief is proposed based upon new 
understandings of financial and other forms of domestic abuse relevant in this 
context. Finally, it addresses remaining issues associated with expanding relief.
A. Joint Civil and Criminal Liability
Couples often decide how to delegate the preparation of tax returns or what 
has been termed the duty to disclose.166 As a result, even if a spouse deliberately 
conceals a failure to report income on a tax return, the other spouse may become 
liable for the resulting tax liability in full, including any penalties and interest, 
which could eclipse in size the original tax liability.167
Even more distressingly, the other spouse, who was really a mere signatory, 
may be held criminally liable for tax and nontax offenses if a court finds the 
individual was “willfully blind” to omissions of income and fraudulent 
representations.168 Pursuant to innocent spouse relief under I.R.C. § 6015, each 
spouse’s tax liability is allocated as though fictional separately filed individual 
returns had been filed.169 However, the IRS may deny this relief if the spouse 
had actual knowledge of unreported income.170
The threats of civil liability and criminal indictment for a wife of a 
noncompliant spouse are very real ones.171 In the case of civil liability, this 
threat never disappears due to an exception to the usual three-year statute of 
limitations period.172 However, there is no statute of limitations for assessing 
taxes in the case of false or fraudulent returns relating to tax evasion. That means 
                                                                                                                     
166 David Gold-Kessler, Assessing the Hazards to an “Innocent Spouse” of Civil and 
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167 See id. at 107–09.
168 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7201 (2012).
169 Id. § 6015(d)(3)(A).
170 See Cheshire v. Commissioner, 282 F.3d 326, 336 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating in the case 
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171 Gold-Kessler, supra note 166, at 103 (observing “a spouse must tread very carefully”
to avoid criminal liability).
172 See I.R.C. § 6501(c)(1). Typically, the IRS only has three years from the date a return 
was filed to assess additional taxes. Id.
2019] OFFSHORE TAX ENFORCEMENT AND DIVORCE 547
a wife could be hit with an enormous tax liability at any time after the divorce, 
which leads to great uncertainty for her, particularly as the typical primary 
caregiver.
In the case of criminal indictment, such wives are subject to possible 
liability for six years after the filing of the false and/or fraudulent returns.173
Each year that taxes were not paid constitutes a separate offense.174 Moreover, 
a court may use the repeated omission of income to infer knowing, willful 
falsification of returns.175 A taxpayer’s good faith reliance upon the advice of a 
qualified accountant may serve as a defense but only if the accountant was 
informed of all relevant facts.176 Accordingly, the passage of time may result in 
freedom from criminal prosecution; however, in the civil context it will lead to 
the compounding of interest on unpaid tax liability.177
This is a reason for the noncompliant husband to use the offshore voluntary 
disclosure program. At least under regular voluntary disclosure, the reporting of 
previously unreported income and the satisfaction of any resulting tax liability 
will limit exposure to only civil penalties.178 Although voluntary disclosure 
cannot guarantee a taxpayer will not face criminal prosecution,179 it may help 
to avoid criminal sanctions provided certain conditions are satisfied.180
B. Innocent Spouse Relief and Its Inadequacies
Simply stated, innocent spouse relief serves as an exception to the general 
rule that a husband and wife filing a joint return are jointly and severally liable 
for the taxes owed on such return.181 Once a compliant spouse finds hidden 
offshore assets, he or she will be confronted with the need for innocent spouse 
relief to escape the joint and several liability that attaches to all jointly filed tax 
returns.182 There are three types of innocent spouse relief under I.R.C. § 6015: 
(1) an election under section 6015(b) for taxpayers still married; (2) an election 
under section 6015(c) for taxpayers separated or divorced whereby the innocent 
                                                                                                                     
173 I.R.C. § 6531 (2012). In terms of criminal liability, the government has six years 
from the date of the offense to issue a criminal indictment for tax evasion, failure to pay 
taxes, or filing a false return. Id.
174 United States v. Smith, 335 F.2d 898, 901 (7th Cir. 1964).
175 United States v. Allen, 551 F.2d 208, 210 (8th Cir. 1977).
176 United States v. Whyte, 699 F.2d 375, 379–80 (7th Cir. 1983).
177 I.R.C. § 6622(a) (2006).
178 See Gold-Kessler, supra note 166, at 108–09 (concluding that taxpayers who 
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179 United States v. Hebel, 668 F.2d 995, 998–99 (8th Cir. 1982).
180 See IRM 9.5.11.9 (Dec. 2, 2012) (explaining that the disclosure must be “truthful, 
timely, complete” and made before the IRS starts an investigation, notifies the taxpayer of 
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181 See I.R.C. § 6015(a)(2) (2006).
182 See generally I.R.C. § 6015 (containing the provision for “relief from joint and 
several liability on joint return”).
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spouse will have her liability limited to only those items allocable to her; or (3) 
equitable relief under section 6015(f) for those innocent spouses who can prove 
full liability would be unfair due to factors such as economic hardship and 
abuse.183 In section 6015(b) cases, the taxpayer has the burden of proving that 
he or she did not know there was “an understatement of tax attributable to [one 
or more] erroneous items [of the other spouse].”184 In section 6015(c) (taxpayers 
no longer married) cases, the Service has the burden of proof.185
This Article primarily addresses an election made under section 6015(c) or 
section 6015(f). In terms of both elections, a consideration of “significant 
benefit”—defined as any benefit beyond normal support due to the failure to 
report or pay tax—is a factor and is discussed infra in Part II.C.186 The main 
problem with section 6015(c) is that a compliant spouse is ineligible for relief if 
the IRS demonstrates “actual knowledge” of a tax understatement at the time of 
the signing of the tax return.187 However, even though section 6015(c) refers to 
knowledge of a tax understatement, courts have held that knowledge of the 
underlying facts giving rise to a deduction or omission of income is enough for 
ineligibility.188 The primary problem with section 6015(f) is that the balancing 
test associated with it fails to correctly conceive of financial abuse and other 
forms of domestic abuse likely present in the discussed context.
1. Current Provisions
In order to obtain innocent spouse relief under section 6015(b) or 
section 6015(c), the taxpayer must petition the IRS no later than two years after 
collection activities have started.189 In the event he or she does not, or otherwise 
cannot obtain relief under these two provisions, the spouse may obtain relief 
under section 6015(f): an equitable relief provision.190 In determining
section 6015(f) equitable relief, one of the factors considered is whether the 
spouse substantially benefited from the failure to pay taxes owed.191 This 
inquiry involves examining whether the spouse could make otherwise 
unaffordable expenditures by having larger amounts of disposable income.192
Additionally, a court may decide to grant section 6015(f) equitable relief if after 
the payment of the tax liability, the spouse would not have income left to cover 
                                                                                                                     
183 See id. §§ 6015(b), (c), (f). 
184 See id. § 6015(b)(1)(B).
185 Id. § 6015(c)(2).
186 See infra Part II.C.
187 I.R.C. § 6015(c)(3)(C) (2012).
188 See McMahon, supra note 162, at 149.
189 See I.R.C. §§ 6015(b)(1)(E), (c)(3)(B).
190 Id. § 6015(f).
191 See Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296, 298.
192 Albin v. Comm’r, 88 T.C.M. (CCH) 340, 347 (2004).
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basic living expenses.193 There are a number of factors examined to make this 
determination, including geographic area, the wife’s age, employment status 
and history, and number of dependents.194
Section 6015(f) equitable relief is also relevant when knowledge—either 
reason to know, as identified in section 6015(b) relief, or actual knowledge, as 
identified in section 6015(c) relief—are at play. Relevantly, a spouse who has 
knowledge may still be granted relief under section 6015(f) provided she (1) did 
not exercise control over her husband’s business income and (2) did not have 
direct access to business receipts.195 This would seem the case in the omission 
of income instances addressed in this section because if the wife had control 
over income or access to business receipts, she would not have to hire forensic 
accountants or expend funds for investigative accounting.196 The importance of 
this distinction is discussed later in this section.197
Nevertheless, because the IRS and Tax Court judges, like society and the 
family law system, misperceive financial abuse and other forms of domestic 
abuse, wives are routinely denied innocent spouse relief. Generally, innocent 
wives of high-net worth tax evaders would be deemed to have knowledge that 
income was received and thus ineligible for relief under section 6015(c), even 
though they did not know about offshore assets and accounts until they hired a 
forensic accountant in the divorce proceedings. Alternatively, their allegations 
of domestic abuse are not believed, and they are deemed ineligible for relief 
under section 6015(f).198 This section argues that wives of noncompliant 
spouses fit the criteria set forth in section 6015(f) once misperceptions about 
financial and other forms of domestic abuse are corrected, and they should be 
granted innocent spouse relief.
2. Legislative History of Innocent Spouse Relief and Wives
An examination of the legislative history of innocent spouse relief shows 
that the provision was enacted to help wives specifically; they were seen as 
being unfairly burdened by the joint and several liability that attaches with the 
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granted”).
195 Farmer v. Comm’r, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 1052, 1054 (2007).
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197 See infra Part II.D.
198 Jacqueline Clarke, (In)Equitable Relief: How Judicial Misconceptions About 
Domestic Violence Prevent Victims from Attaining Innocent Spouse Relief Under I.R.C. §
6015(F), 22 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 825, 841 (2014) [hereinafter Clarke Study].
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filing of a joint return.199 An unnerving problem is that Congress failed to define 
“unfair burden” in this context.200 At the same time, there are other provisions
in the Internal Revenue Code that may provide relief to wives who are unable 
to pay taxes owed, and the discussion here must acknowledge these other 
avenues as well.201
Up until the end of the 1960’s, joint and several liability was applied without 
much objection from joint filers.202 In the early years of joint filing, the only 
way wives could escape liability for taxes owed in connection with joint returns 
was to prove that they signed a return under duress.203 Moreover, relief under 
the now repealed I.R.C. § 6013(e) required a substantial understatement of 
tax.204 In 1971, after several wives were held liable for taxes owed due to their 
husband’s embezzlement, complaints arose regarding the inadequacy of the 
duress defense, and Congress’s answer was innocent spouse relief.205 As 
initially enacted, innocent spouse relief was not intended to apply to all joint 
filers but rather was to relieve wives from extreme financial hardship posed 
because of joint and several liability.206 Innocent spouse relief continued to 
operate as a constricted form of relief until 1984 when modest expansion 
occurred.207
However, it was not until 1998 that innocent spouse relief was liberalized 
to its present form since prior to this time relief was only available in a highly 
restricted form.208 In 1998, Congress enacted the IRS Restructuring and Reform 
Act of 1998 (RRA), which provided several exceptions to the usual rule of joint 
and several liability.209 One of the purposes of the RRA was to provide relief to 
                                                                                                                     
199 See McMahon, supra note 162, at 147.
200 Id.
201 See id. at 154–56; see also supra notes 159–61 and accompanying text.
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203 See In re Hinckley, 256 B.R. 814, 828 (2000); Wiksell v. Comm’r, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 
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INNOCENT SPOUSE RELIEF (1998), https://www.gao.gov/assets/90/87449.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MW8A-9WSS].
208 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-02-558, TAX ADMINISTRATION: IRS’S
INNOCENT SPOUSE PROGRAM PERFORMANCE IMPROVED; BALANCED PERFORMANCE 
MEASURE NEEDED 4 (2002); see also I.R.C. § 6013, repealed by Pub. L. 105-206, tit. III, 
§ 320l(e)(l), 112 Stat. 740 (1998).
209 I.R.C. § 6015 (2012); see also Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform 
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685, 734-35 (1998).
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wives who unknowingly became liable for tax deficiencies caused by their 
husbands.210 As stated in the 1998 Congressional Conference Report, prior to 
the passage of the RRA, 90% of innocent spouse relief cases were brought by 
wives.211 Moreover, Professor Stephanie McMahon’s 2012 empirical study 
confirms that women make up an overwhelming number of innocent spouse 
relief requests.212 Specifically, 338 women compared to 59 men brought cases 
before the Tax Court, i.e., 85% of the cases were from women.213 In fact, 
McMahon emphasizes that Congress termed innocent spouse relief a women’s
issue.214 Jacqueline Clarke’s 2014 study builds upon the McMahon Empirical 
Study and evinces that the number is even more skewed in terms of the number 
of requesting taxpayers who alleged abuse.215 She found that 91.67% of 
taxpayers requesting innocent spouse relief while alleging abuse were 
women.216 Notably, women have won 89.50% of innocent spouse relief 
victories in general and 93% of those where abuse was alleged.217 One must 
conclude, as Clarke does, that innocent spouse relief and allegations of abuse 
are gendered in terms of the tax world.218
Nevertheless, it is clear that family law courts and tax courts still 
misconceive domestic violence and the danger it poses.219 Typically, women 
who raise domestic violence concerns are mischaracterized as doing so to gain 
                                                                                                                     
210 See McMahon, supra note 162, at 147; see also 144 CONG. REC. 14,688–689 (1998);
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[hereinafter McMahon, Empirical Study].
213 Id.
214 Id. at 631.
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[https://perma.cc/M3Y7-8UMA].
219 Clarke Study, supra note 198, at 828–29.
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a tactical advantage.220 In order to properly analyze the granting of innocent 
spouse relief to women, one must understand the other biases that operate in our 
justice system.221 Additionally, Clarke confronts the distressing problem that 
some men may feign abuse and claim innocent spouse relief when, in fact, they 
are the abuser in the relationship.222
It is estimated that since the RRA was passed, the IRS has received more 
than 1,000 applications for innocent spouse relief every week.223 As part of 
sweeping changes resulting from Congress’ direction to the IRS to view 
taxpayers more akin to customers, the innocent spouse relief provisions became 
more flexible and thereby opened up to a larger number.224 Instead of focusing 
on financial hardship, the provisions focused on whether innocent spouse relief 
granted “meaningful relief in all cases where such relief is appropriate.”225
Nevertheless, Congress’ failure to define when such relief is “appropriate” has 
led to a number of problems, which are relevant for the aforementioned 
discussion. For example, is it “appropriate” to provide relief to spouses who 
were not coerced into false tax reporting?226 Is it “appropriate” to afford relief 
to spouses who are already suffering financial hardship?227 When one examines 
the committee reports and statements made during the congressional debates, a
common thread is that an innocent spouse is one who lacked knowledge of his 
or her spouse’s wrongdoing in filing a fraudulent return.228
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It is patently clear that Congress’ expanded relief was meant primarily for 
wives.229 The unrelenting pursuit of wives in terms of abusive collection was 
deemed unacceptable.230 Moreover, Congress intended to provide relief to 
divorced or separated wives who were left with debilitating tax liabilities due to 
calculating and deceiving husbands.231 Some scholars have posited that 
Congress left the definition of “appropriate” ambiguous due to the costs 
associated with drafting a more specific rule.232 Nevertheless, the IRS and the 
courts have been left to use, in most cases, a facts and circumstances test to 
determine whether relief is warranted.233 While the two other forms of relief 
explicitly call for an examination of equity,234 the section 6015(c) form does not 
expressly.235 As explained earlier, section 6015(c) relief is intended to assist the 
spouses that are divorced or separated.236 These wives are able to obtain relief 
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2013-43 I.R.B. 397.
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provided they did not have “actual knowledge,” which is a problematic 
requirement as this Article explains.237
3. Lingering State Liability
Even if a wife secures federal innocent spouse relief, a state hurdle of 
liability may also be present. Both marriage and dissolution are governed by 
state law.238 State courts tasked with dividing marital assets have mainly 
affirmed their right to do so—separate and without influence from any IRS or 
federal tax court proceedings.239
For example, in the 1984 In re Marriage of Dunseth, the Appellate Court of 
Illinois scolded a trial court for trying to protect a wife in a dissolution 
proceeding from liability owed to creditors, including the IRS.240 The appellate 
court maintained that the creditors were not parties to the proceeding, and 
therefore, the trial court’s order that the husband pay debts owed to them was 
not binding upon the creditors.241 Importantly, the Dunseth court was skeptical 
of the innocent spouse relief the wife had obtained because she enjoyed a lavish 
lifestyle during the marriage due to her husband’s failure pay taxes, inter alia.242
Several months later, the Ninth Circuit held that an innocent spouse 
determination is not controlling in terms of contribution rights under state law 
under either the Supremacy Clause or the doctrine of res judicata.243
Contribution rights could stem from either a divorce decree or a general 
contribution statute.244 In this case, a former husband sought to challenge the 
Tax Court’s acceptance of his ex-wife’s and the IRS’s stipulation that the ex-
wife was an innocent spouse “on the ground that she relied on her husband and 
their accountant to assure that the returns were properly prepared, and she did 
not benefit from the understatement of tax because the unpaid tax money was 
spent on his new wife or previous affairs.”245
In other words, state decisions confirm a wife may receive innocent spouse 
relief from the IRS but still remain liable for an allocation of tax liability under 
state law.246 The California Court of Appeals case In re Marriage of Hargrave
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admonishes spouses that it is not a foregone conclusion that they will escape tax 
liability through a grant of innocent spouse relief where a state court previously 
has apportioned liability in a dissolution proceeding.247 The Kentucky Court of 
Appeals has taken a similar approach, reasoning that IRS innocent spouse relief 
is an “administrative process” and not an adjudication that directs the party from 
whom the IRS will pursue payment.248 It further noted that a Federal Tax Court 
decision is not controlling in terms of state division of marital debt that 
encompasses tax liability.249
The Court of Appeals of Washington has taken a slightly softer stance.250 It 
has acknowledged that the deliberate and unnecessary shoring up of tax liability 
by one spouse may be considered in apportioning marital debts in a dissolution 
proceeding.251 At the same time, the Court prohibited a trial court from basing 
its order on a federal innocent spouse relief finding.252 Some appellate courts
have concluded that federal tax liability must be litigated solely in federal courts 
relying on precedent from other jurisdictions.253 Similarly, the Court of Appeals 
of Wisconsin recognized in In re Marriage of Jahimiak that although the trial 
court may not make a determination as to federal innocent spouse relief, it could 
properly allocate marital debt to the spouse who was in charge of family 
finances and prepared the tax returns as well as was the only beneficiary of the 
false returns.254
The Court of Appeals of Arkansas has taken a slightly more nuanced 
approach, and Nebraska has largely agreed with it. In Killough v. Killough, the 
appellate court upheld a trial court’s divorce decree allocating to the husband 
responsibility for paying penalties and interest resulting from his failure to 
report income and allocating to the wife one half of the tax liability that she 
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would have been responsible for if the income had been reported.255 The 
Supreme Court of Nebraska has taken a similar approach, characterizing 
penalties and interest as nonmarital debt and allocating liability for them to the 
spouse responsible for the incurrence.256 Likewise, funds owed to the IRS spent 
by one spouse on nonmarital pursuits have been deemed nonmarital debt.257
On the one hand, the trial court setting serves as another bite at the apple 
beyond federal innocent spouse relief to shield a spouse from at least civil 
liability provided a convincing case exists that equity dictates such a result.258
On the other hand, there is no guarantee that the trial court will uphold a grant 
of federal innocent spouse relief.259 However, it is still important for a wife of a 
noncompliant spouse to receive at least federal innocent spouse relief and 
hopefully reforms in that area will lead to eventual state reform as well.
C. Problems with the Current Approach 
An examination of innocent spouse relief reveals that it is quite difficult to 
obtain.260 One of the reasons for the difficulty in securing relief under 
section 6015(c) is the mismatch in terms of intent. As explained earlier, a 
noncompliant spouse must intentionally violate a known legal duty to face 
criminal prosecution or penalties.261 In contrast, a compliant spouse is 
disqualified from receiving innocent spouse relief by simply knowing that 
income was received.262 In other words, a compliant spouse who does not know 
about the legal duty to report or pay tax on foreign income typically will be 
ineligible for innocent spouse relief under current law: “actual knowledge” of 
any item giving rise to a tax deficiency (i.e., knowledge that income was 
received) is enough to disqualify such a spouse even if the individual had no 
knowledge of the source of such income.263 Until this inequity is corrected, we 
are disincentivizing compliant spouses from working with the government and 
punishing them for the sins of the noncompliant spouse, even if they knew 
nothing about them.
Another contributing factor is the pervasive misperception about financial 
and other forms of domestic abuse. In theory, there are two ways out of the 
“actual knowledge” trap. First, an “innocent” spouse may receive relief despite 
actual knowledge if the individual was (1) “the victim of [domestic] abuse”
before the return was signed and (2) as a result, failed to challenge the treatment 
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of any item out of fear of retaliation.264 Second, an innocent spouse who signed 
the return under duress remains eligible.265 Nevertheless, the stark reality is that 
innocent spouse relief is denied even where domestic abuse, including financial 
abuse, is shown.266
As Clarke has stated, the IRS and the Tax Court do not understand the 
“interplay between domestic violence and innocent spouse cases.”267 Moreover, 
National Taxpayer Advocate Nina Olson has reprimanded the IRS for 
“display[ing] an astonishing ignorance about what happens to people in abusive 
relationships” in the context of innocent spouse relief cases.268 In the 2008 case, 
Nihiser v. Commissioner, Judge Holmes voiced a similar concern and noted the 
lack of regulations and “ordinary cannons of construction” in this context.269
Finally, scholars have also commented upon the dearth of empirical research 
regarding innocent spouse relief and the even greater void in terms of 
conclusions about how Tax Court judges rule on domestic abuse claims.270
Two leading studies are discussed in the following analysis of problems 
with current innocent spouse relief under section 6015(c) and section 6015(f). 
McMahon performed an empirical analysis of 444 innocent spouse relief claims 
from 1998 through 2011, noting how the Tax Court examined the factors from 
Revenue Ruling 2003-61 (“the McMahon Empirical Study”).271 Clarke focused 
more on the issue of abuse and thus specifically dealt with the fifty-six cases 
where the “innocent spouse” alleged abuse (“the Clarke Study”).272 Her goal 
was to determine what had happened when the abuse claim was sustained versus 
denied as a means of ultimately determining what factors courts deem 
dispositive in this context.273 The Clarke Study,274 like the McMahon Empirical 
Study, focuses on Tax Court cases since the majority of innocent spouse relief 
appeals are heard there.275
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1. Election Under Section 6015(c)
“Actual knowledge” under I.R.C. § 6015(c) is determined according to a 
facts and circumstances test detailed in Treasury Regulation § 1.6015-
3(c)(2)(iv).276 This test involves, for example, exploring whether the spouse 
deliberately avoided learning about an item on the tax return or had an 
ownership interest in the property that resulted in an erroneous item on the 
return.277 At the same time, the IRS’s burden in proving “actual knowledge” is 
a mere preponderance of the evidence, which stands in sharp contrast to the 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard necessary for a criminal conviction of the 
noncompliant spouse.278 One bright side for the innocent spouse is that the IRS 
cannot meet the preponderance of the evidence standard with mere proof of what 
a reasonably prudent person would be expected to know.279
In terms of this Article, the “omitted income” innocent spouse cases are the 
most relevant. A noncompliant spouse—and by virtue of joint and several 
liability, their compliant spouse—who fails to report offshore income would fall 
into this category. A major problem with innocent spouse relief in the context 
of omitted income cases is the key question that the IRS and courts ask: whether 
the “innocent spouse” had knowledge of the receipt of income, not knowledge 
of the source of income.280 For example, if a wife knows the husband owns 
corporate stock but does not know a dividend has been paid, she remains eligible 
for innocent spouse relief.281 However, if a wife knows that $150,000 was 
received but does not know the source of the money, she becomes ineligible.282
Even more perplexingly, under the Treasury Regulations, lack of 
knowledge of how an item was reported is not relevant.283 In the 2002 D.C. 
Circuit case Mitchell v. Commissioner, a wife was held ineligible for innocent 
spouse relief because she knew of the receipt of a retirement plan distribution 
even though she did not know the tax consequences of the distribution.284 The 
Fifth Circuit case Cheshire v. Commissioner bars relief for all spouses with 
actual knowledge of the income producing transaction, even if such spouses lack 
knowledge of the incorrect tax reporting of the transaction.285 However, in 
Martin v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, a wife who knew her husband had 
transferred stock and land but did not know the amount that was transferred was 
deemed not to have actual knowledge regarding the amount of financial gain 
                                                                                                                     
276 Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-3(c)(2)(iv) (2002). 
277 Id.
278 Id. § 1.605-3(c)(2).
279 See Culver v. Comm’r, 116 T.C. 189, 189 (2001).
280 See Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-3(c)(2)(i), (iii).
281 Id. 
282 See id.
283 Id. § 1.6015-3(c)(2)(ii).
284 Mitchell v. Comm’r, 292 F.3d 800, 803 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
285 Cheshire v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 183 (2000), aff’d, 282 F.3d 326, 336 (5th Cir. 2002).
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from the transaction.286 One may conclude that the only “knowledge” required 
to disqualify a compliant spouse is knowledge of the amount of money received, 
not knowledge of incorrect reporting or of failure to report the income.
Under the current law, coercion and deception, both of which are likely 
relevant in the offshore context, are not enough to achieve innocent spouse 
relief. Although due to a change in 2012 coercion was to receive greater weight 
in terms of the balancing factors used in determining whether innocent spouse 
relief will be granted, it has served an unclear role.287 A dispositive indicator of 
coercion is whether abuse was present.288 However, coercion and abuse have 
been treated inconsistently in this context.289 In 60.7% of the cases where abuse 
was alleged, the court found no abuse but still granted relief in 14.7% of these 
cases.290 In 27.3% of cases where abuse was found, no relief was granted.291
Currently, the innocent spouse relief form does not even ask about 
deception.292 While a lack of knowledge does not necessarily mean deception 
is present, it is an important factor to consider in determining whether a wife 
was innocent in signing a return. In 2012, it was determined that deception alone 
was not enough for relief.293 In fact, wives who have asserted they were 
deceived about an ineligible deduction or unreported income have had this 
argument backfire.294 In other words, they were denied relief because they were 
deemed to have actual knowledge of the deficiency.295
Moreover, due to a change in 2012, it was supposed to become easier to 
achieve relief where abuse or a lack of financial control were shown. These 
factors were to outweigh others in the balancing test.296 Clearly, that has not 
been the case as illustrated in the next section.
2. Election Under Section 6015(f)
Unfortunately, wives who are victims of domestic abuse, including financial 
abuse, often are not provided with innocent spouse relief because the tax system 
misconceives the nature of domestic violence. Specifically, the factors the IRS 
                                                                                                                     
286 Martin v. Comm’r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 665, 670 (2000).
287 McMahon, supra note 162, at 156.
288 Id. at 151.
289 See McMahon, Empirical Study, supra note 212, at 695. 
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 8857: REQUEST FOR INNOCENT SPOUSE RELIEF 
(2014).
293 McMahon, supra note 162, at 152.
294 See Chesire v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 183 (2000), aff’d, 282 F.3d 326, 335 (5th Cir. 
2002); Wiskell v. Comm’r, 90 F.3d 1459, 1462–63 (9th Cir. 1996).
295 See Cheshire, 282 F.3d at 335; Wiskell, 90 F.3d at 1463.
296 See I.R.S. Notice 2011-70, 2011-2 I.R.B. 135 (eliminating the two-year statute of 
limitations for § 6015(f) requests). Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 297. I.R.S. Notice 2012-
8, 2012-4 I.R.B. 309, expanded the definitions of factors, which were expanded again in Rev. 
Proc. 2013-34, 2013-43 I.R.B. 398.
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and the Tax Court use to determine whether a victim of domestic violence 
should receive relief under section 6015(f) often lead to inequitable 
outcomes.297 There is no guidance in the Internal Revenue Code for how the 
Tax Court should even evaluate a claim of abuse.298 Instead, there is only 
Revenue Procedure Ruling 2003-61, which provides a list of factors that the Tax 
Court should consider in deciding an innocent spouse relief claim.299 Perhaps 
more distressing, Tax Court opinions reflect inconsistent and unattainable 
requirements in terms of how to substantiate abuse claims.300 For example, 
judges have denied claims for relief unless a protection order was granted.301 In 
other instances, judges have dismissed the alleged abuse as not serious if joint 
custody of a child has been granted.302 These rulings show that Tax Court judges 
do not understand the power and control dynamics that accompany domestic 
abuse.303
Clarke examined sixty Tax Court cases where the innocent spouse sought 
relief and made a claim of domestic violence.304 Specifically, the study 
examined whether the Tax Court upheld a claim of domestic violence, and if so, 
upon what evidence.305 The study then determined whether there was a 
correlation between a finding of domestic violence and the granting of equitable 
relief under section 6015(f).306 Clarke noted that her research was aimed at 
“provid[ing] equitable tax relief to victims of domestic abuse who, because of 
the misconceptions of domestic violence in the present tax system, might 
otherwise be unsuccessful in their endeavors.”307
Under section 6015(f), a spouse is granted relief from a tax deficiency 
provided “taking into account all of the facts and circumstances, it is
inequitable” to deny relief.308 To make this determination, the IRS must use a 
set of revenue procedure guidelines established by the Internal Revenue Service 
Commissioner in 2003.309 Pursuant to Revenue Ruling 2003-61, the spouse 
                                                                                                                     
297 See Clarke Study, supra note 198, at 828.
298 Id.
299 See Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296.
300 See Clarke Study, supra note 198, at 828.
301 See Acoba v. Comm’r, No. 4002-05S, 2010 WL 1993610, at *5 (T.C. May 19, 2010) 
(noting that a restraining order had been issued but where it is unclear whether the order was 
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302 See Sotuyo v. Comm’r, No. 25692-10S, 2012 WL 1021306, at *5 (T.C. Mar. 27, 
2012) (concluding that the wife’s evidence of abuse was insufficient to show she failed to 
challenge the husband’s omission of income because she feared retaliation based upon a 
grant of joint legal and shared custody and the lack of a supervised visitation order).
303 See Clarke Study, supra note 198, at 828.
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306 Id.
307 Id. at 828–29.
308 I.R.C. § 6015(f) (2006).
309 Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296.
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must meet seven threshold requirements before the request for equitable relief 
under section 6015(f) will even commence.310 If a requesting spouse meets 
these seven threshold requirements, she may automatically qualify for relief 
under section 6015(f) provided she falls under the safe harbor.311 To qualify 
under the safe harbor, she must show (1) she is legally separated or divorced at 
the time of requesting relief;312 (2) she had no knowledge or reason to know at 
the time she signed the return that her spouse would not pay the liability;313 and 
(3) she would incur economic hardship if relief were denied.314 At the same 
time, if the innocent spouse does not satisfy the safe harbor requirements, the 
IRS can still conclude that equitable relief is warranted by using a balancing 
test.315 A non-exhaustive list of balancing factors also is set forth in Revenue 
Ruling 2003-61.316 These factors include whether the innocent spouse benefited 
significantly from the failure to pay taxes owed, was subject to abuse, or had 
poor mental or physical health when she signed the return.317 The IRS will then 
determine whether each of the balancing factors supports relief, does not support 
relief, or is neutral.318 In terms of innocent spouse relief applicants who are also 
victims of domestic violence, the two most important facts to prove concern (1) 
whether she had knowledge of the understatement of tax and (2) whether she 
was abused in the marriage.319
                                                                                                                     
310 Id. at 297. These seven threshold requirements are the following: (1) the filing of a 
joint return, (2) an inability to qualify for relief under IRC §§ 6015(b) and (c), (3) a timely 
application for relief, (4) an absence of fraudulent transfers of assets, (5) an absence of 
transfers of disqualified assets, (6) an absence of fraudulent intent, (7) the tax deficiency is 
due to the non-requesting spouse. Id.
311 Id. at 298.
312 Id. 
313 In terms of this factor, the court considers (1) her level of education; (2) the presence 
of deception or evasiveness on the part of the husband, (3) her degree of involvement in the 
activity leading to the income tax liability, (4) her involvement in business and household
financial issues, (5) her financial expertise, and (6) any lavish spending or purchases. Id. 
314 Id. In order to determine economic hardship, factors detailed in Treas. Reg. 
§ 301.6343-1(b)(4) are used. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 298. These factors include (1) 
the wife’s age, employment, ability to earn, and number of dependents, (2) reasonably 
necessary expenses for basic living expenses such as food, clothing, housing, medical, and 
transportation; and (3) cost of living in the relevant geographic area. Treas. Reg. § 3.01.6343-
1(b)(4) (2018); Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 C.B. 298; see also Butner v. Comm’r, 93 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1290, 1297 (2007) (“[E]conomic hardship exists if collection of the tax 
liability will cause a taxpayer to be unable to pay such taxpayer’s reasonable basic living 
expenses.”). 
315 Butner, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1296.
316 Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 298–99.
317 Id. at 299.
318 Id. at 298.
319 Id. at 298–99. The requesting wife must prove that she did not have knowledge or 
reason to know. Id. at 298. Failure to do so will count against her claim for relief. Id. Failure 
to prove abuse, on the other hand, will have a neutral effect. Id. at 299.
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If a requesting spouse can establish duress, she will be entitled to innocent 
spouse relief.320 However, if she is unable to prove duress and does not fall 
within the safe harbor provision above, she will be left with trying to prove 
abuse during the marriage.321 It is important to understand the difference 
between duress and abuse. Duress must be present at the time of the signing of 
the return, i.e., it is the forcing of the wife to sign the return.322 In contrast, abuse 
(not rising to the level of duress) is different from duress in two fundamental 
ways: (1) it is perceived as less severe and (2) it occurs either before or after the 
signing of the return, not at the time the return is signed.323 For example, factor 
two of the safe harbor provision, i.e., lack of knowledge, was not satisfied in 
Venables v. Commissioner because the wife knew that their family was suffering 
financial difficulty when she signed the return.324 However, under the balancing 
test, the wife was able to show abuse.325 The Tax Court recognized that the 
husband financially controlled the wife by threatening to physically harm her 
whenever she asked to withdraw funds from their joint account.326 As a result, 
the wife was granted equitable relief despite her having had knowledge.327
Clarke provides a summary of the types of evidence the Tax Court relies upon 
in determining that abuse was present and the “potential biases and 
inconsistencies” that plague the analyses.328
Wives of noncompliant spouses should be entitled to relief due to the nature 
of their circumstances. This Article proposes that a spouse who has knowledge 
of the receipt of income, but who lacks knowledge of its source, i.e., who did 
not know that it came from hidden offshore assets/accounts (later discovered), 
should be eligible for innocent spouse relief under I.R.C. § 6015(c). Such 
spouses should be eligible to apply for innocent spouse relief before collection 
activity starts and even before the IRS notifies the taxpayer of an audit or 
possible outstanding liability.329
To summarize leading scholars in the area, innocent spouse relief is both 
under- and over-inclusive.330 The purpose of this Article is not to explore the 
overall shortcomings of innocent spouse relief. Rather, this Article focuses on 
granting wives of noncompliant spouses innocent spouse relief in order to 
promote their whistleblowing either during or after dissolution proceedings. A 
general belief among scholars in the area is that innocent spouse relief should 
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321 See, e.g., Stergios v. Comm’r, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1057, 1061 (2009).
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329 See Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-5(b)(3), (5).
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be available for taxpayers who are not culpable in filing.331 Clearly, the wives 
of noncompliant spouses satisfy that criteria. Namely, this Article argues that 
coercion and deception should automatically entitle relief.332 In the offshore 
context described in Part I, at least one of these factors, and likely both, are 
present. As a result, it is not only “appropriate” but also expedient in terms of 
overall collection objectives to grant such wives relief.
D. Rethinking Domestic Abuse and Innocent Spouse Relief 
A common misconception about domestic violence is that victims fall 
within a certain stereotype.333 Typically, the perception is that such women are 
part of a lower socioeconomic class and also are either racial minorities or 
immigrants.334 Unfortunately, this latent bias leads many to fear that judges will 
not find domestic violence exists if the victim does not conform to these 
stereotypes.335 One may conclude that the wives of high-net-worth tax evaders 
will not fall within these stereotypes by virtue of their socioeconomic status 
alone. As a result, Clarke set out to elucidate the “diverse profiles of domestic 
violence victims” to disprove the veracity of traditional stereotypes.336
Moreover, she explored whether Tax Court judges nevertheless continue to 
award innocent spouse relief based upon inaccurate stereotypes.337 The 
following Part makes use of the Clarke Study to examine the obstacles that will 
                                                                                                                     
331 See, e.g., id. at 145.
332 See id. at 176–77. 
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Wendy McElroy, Domestic Violence: Behind the Stereotypes, IFEMINISTS.COM (Nov. 10, 
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336 See Clarke Study, supra note 198, at 835.
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confront wives of high-net-worth tax evaders in seeking innocent spouse relief 
under section 6015(c) or section 6015(f) through the lens of likely attendant 
domestic abuse and proposes a solution.
1. Domestic Abuse Victims Married to Primary Wage Earners
Importantly for these purposes, in more than 60% of the Clarke Study cases, 
i.e., those where the requesting wife also alleged abuse, the abuser was the 
primary wage earner.338 In the high-net-worth divorces addressed here, the 
husband would also likely be the primary wage earner. As a result, Tax Court 
judges should be more cognizant of the likelihood that abuse is occurring in the 
cases described in Part I and rule appropriately.
As the Clarke Study evinces, there is no one distinguishing profile of a 
“domestic abuse victim seeking tax relief.”339 A wife’s educational level, 
employment qualifications, etc. are varied.340 However, one constant theme is 
the “economic dependence and financial control” present.341 In approximately 
53% of the cases, the non-requesting spouse had complete control over 
finances.342 The requesting spouses alleging abuse typically reported that they 
either were given a strict allowance or knew nothing about the family’s
finances.343 Relevantly, most of the requesting spouses were not alleging 
financial abuse even though it was present.344 Instead, they were asserting 
physical, verbal, or emotional abuse.345 Unfortunately, none of the regulations 
deal with whether financial control is indeed circumstantial evidence of 
abuse.346 Clarke strongly urges that where a requesting spouse is unable to 
provide evidence to corroborate allegations of other forms of abuse, judges 
should weigh the presence of financial abuse as indicative of abuse.347
2. Preconceived Notions of Abuse
An overarching and pervasive problem is how Tax Court judges perceive
abuse.348 As recently apparent, media coverage perpetuates a conception of 
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domestic abuse as involving physical violence and protection orders.349 As a 
result, if a requesting spouse alleges mental, emotional, or financial abuse, Tax 
Court and other judges will be reluctant to find abuse occurred because this type 
of abuse does not fit within their preconceived notions.350 At the same time, a 
wife who alleges physical abuse and does not have photos, protective orders, or 
medical records may also face an insurmountable obstacle in proving abuse in 
Tax Court.351
In the controversial O’Neil v. Commissioner decision,352 the American 
public became somewhat aware of the narrow view of domestic abuse used by 
Tax Court judges.353 Judge Holmes concluded that the plaintiff, Allison, did not 
prove abuse because there was no “documentation” of it.354 Attorney Cathy 
Brennan criticized this view since it fails to take account of the true dynamics 
of an abusive relationship and how an abuser “dominates all aspects of his 
partner’s life and uses all tactics available to him to control her.”355
Indeed, there is a high likelihood that this type of abuse is present where the 
husband is using offshore accounts and entities to hide money from his spouse. 
Taking the money offshore and then refusing to provide the wife with any 
information about it is part of a cycle of domination and control. Even when 
faced with sanctions and motions to compel in the family law context, an 
abusive husband will not provide his victim with requested information, 
reflecting a pervasive need to continue to control her.356
While the marital status of the wives described in Part II would weigh in 
favor of relief, the inconsistent and perplexing treatment of abuse in Tax Court 
will make the road to relief a difficult or impossible one. The Tax Court places 
significant weight on the marital status of the requesting spouse.357 Under 
section 6015(c), relief may be obtained only if the spouse is separated or 
divorced.358 Although a spouse who is still married may seek relief under 
section 6015(f), it will weigh against the grant of such relief under the balancing 
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test of Revenue Procedure 2003-61.359 In fact, marital status has proven 
determinative.360
In terms of considering when to file, scholars have noted that abuse often 
continues after the marriage has ended.361 For example, joint custody provides 
an abuser with an opportunity to continue to exert power and control over a
victim.362 In light of this phenomenon, it must be acknowledged that some wives 
will avoid filing for innocent spouse relief even after separation or divorce 
because they fear retaliation.363 As a result, some women choose to postpone 
filing for innocent spouse relief until after their abuser dies.364
Another related obstacle is the question among Tax Court judges why 
women do not allege domestic violence in divorce proceedings or on the 
innocent spouse request forms, choosing instead to wait until the case is before 
the IRS or Tax Court.365 This causes judges to suspect that the wife is lying 
about or embellishing the abuse.366 However, they fail to realize that oftentimes 
the women do not disclose the abuse earlier out of fear or because of the “legal 
repercussions.”367 For example, the presence of children in the marriage may 
affect whether the wife will allege domestic violence in a divorce proceeding.368
Moreover, scholars have noted that many victims of domestic violence are 
unable to perceive how dire the situation is, and these women are often caught 
in denial and secrecy.369 As a result, some women who have been abused will 
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need time to realize that they were subject to abuse.370 Such wives should not 
be punished for delaying in making an abuse claim.
Again, behavior in the family law context could inform the tax context. For 
instance, family mediators and family law judges often do not have proper 
insight into domestic abuse, and as a result, alleged abusers are frequently 
awarded sole or joint custody of children.371 They suffer from the same reliance 
on stereotypes as Tax Court judges attempting to parse through abuse 
allegations.372 Here again, unreasonable behavior on the part of the 
noncompliant spouse in terms of custody mediation or time share plans should 
signal to the Tax Court that abuse allegations should be more fully considered 
in determining whether to grant innocent spouse relief.373
3. Correlation Between Abuse Claims & Innocent Spouse Relief
Tax practitioners are correct in determining there is a correlation between a 
Tax Court judge’s upholding an abuse claim and granting innocent spouse 
relief.374 In fact, the Clarke Study showed that in 90% of cases where abuse was 
judicially determined, equitable relief under section 6015(f) was granted.375 The 
problem is that Tax Court judges who are often unfamiliar with domestic abuse 
do not have a definition of abuse and have been given a non-exhaustive list of 
factors to consult.376 Regarding the first issue, the only guidance Tax Court 
judges have in terms of defining abuse is provided in Revenue Procedure 2003-
61.377 It requires that the wife have been a victim of abuse prior to signing the 
return and that given the abuse, she was afraid that refusing to sign the return 
would result in retaliation.378 There is really no definition provided at all.
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4. Problematic Corroboration Requirement
Judicial interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2003-61 has made it more 
difficult for victims to secure a finding of abuse.379 The Tax Court’s further 
requirement that abuse be corroborated further shows that judges do not 
understand the nature of the abuse.380 In terms of physical abuse, even the 
presence or absence of police reports has not proven dispositive.381
Compounding the problem is the perception of domestic violence as a “private 
matter” by both police officers and judges.382 Domestic violence is common and 
under-reported.383 According to a 2003 study, only 14.5% of serious assaults 
lead to police reporting.384 Many women choose not to report domestic violence 
because they are afraid of retaliation, endangerment to children, and public 
ridicule.385
Tax Court judges’ additional requirement that a claim of abuse be 
corroborated before it can weigh in favor of a grant of relief is particularly 
problematic in the context of non-physical abuse.386 However, even when 
victims have provided third party testimony of verbal and mental abuse, Tax 
Court judges have dismissed this form of corroboration as inadequate, and their 
rulings have been inconsistent.387 For example in Collier v. Commissioner, the 
wife called a friend to testify about her husband’s verbal onslaughts that she had 
                                                                                                                     
379 See id. at 848 (discussing corroboration requirements).
380 See id.
381 See, e.g., McKnight v. Comm’r, 92 T.C.M. (CCH) 76, 81 (2006) (finding that the 
abuse had been corroborated despite the lack of criminal charges brought or medical 
attention sought where the police were called to the home on two occasions due to violent 
attacks); cf. e.g., Sotuyo v. Comm’r, No. 25692-10S, 2012 WL 1021306, at *5 (T.C. Mar. 
27, 2012) (dismissing an abuse claim corroborated by a police report and concluding the 
behavior did not rise to the level that would have made the wife sign a return that omitted 
income out of fear); Ladehoff v. Comm’r, No. 16814-10S, 2012 WL 612501, at *3 (T.C. 
Feb. 27, 2012) (finding the same in the context of a husband’s request for innocent spouse 
relief where two police reports had been filed).
382 KRISTIN A. KELLY, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE POLITICS OF PRIVACY 3 (2003).
383 See Clarke Study, supra note 198, at 848 (citing SHANNAN M. CATALANO, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY: CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2003 1
(2004) (finding only 48% of all violent victimizations are reported)).
384 See KELLY, supra note 382, at 3.
385 See Clarke Study, supra note 198, at 848 (citing Barbara R. Borreno, In Search of 
Guidance: An Examination of Past, Present, and Future Adjudications of Domestic Violence 
Asylum Claims, 64 VAND. L. REV. 225, 243 (2011)) (revealing the perception of domestic 
violence as a “hidden problem” involving “invisible” victims that tend not to tell others about 
the abuse due to a number of reasons, including fear and shame).
386 See id. at 847 (citing Pullins v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 432, 454 (2011); Venables v. 
Comm’r, No. 22068-08S, 2010 WL 1980316, at *7 (T.C. May 18, 2010); Bruen v. Comm’r,
98 T.C.M. (CCH) 400, 401–06 (2009); Fox v. Comm’r, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 731, 734 (2006); 
Bright v. Comm’r, No. 3839-04S, 2005 WL 2444050, at *6 (T.C. Oct. 4, 2005); Rooks v. 
Comm’r, No. 11874-02S, 2003 WL 21350037, at *4 (T.C. June 11, 2003)).
387 See Collier v. Comm’r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1799, 1809 (2002).
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witnessed as well as a psychologist she had seen for depression.388 Nevertheless, 
the Tax Court was dismissive of her friend’s testimony, characterizing it as 
conclusory and similarly found that the psychologist’s testimony was 
insufficient to establish abuse.389
In contrast, the Tax Court held in Chadwick v. Commissioner that the wife’s
testimony alone was adequate to establish that she had been abused during the 
marriage.390 Similarly, in Thomassen v. Commissioner, a judge upheld an abuse 
claim where children and family friends testified as to the presence of abuse.391
The corroboration requirement prevents wives of high-net-worth tax 
evaders from securing relief even if they have been abused. Most wives seeking 
innocent spouse relief will not have protection orders and police reports that 
they can introduce during a trial.392 In addition, many wives will not have third 
parties who can testify as to the abuse393 because one of the tactics of an abuser 
is to isolate the victim to engender co-dependence and to cut off the victim from 
available help.394 Finally, many wives will not check the box indicating abuse 
on Innocent Spouse Relief Request Form 8857 because the IRS is mandated to 
contact their husbands even where domestic violence is at issue.395 While the 
wife’s information is protected during the IRS review of the request, if she 
appeals a denial to the Tax Court, all of the information listed on the form 
becomes discoverable.396 The key to resolving this problem is affording proper 
weight to provable financial abuse.
5. Financial Abuse Mitigates “Knowledge”
Tax Court judges have been extremely reluctant to uphold abuse claims 
where non-physical abuse has been alleged.397 At the same time, the current 
                                                                                                                     
388 See id. 
389 See id.
390 See Chadwick v. Comm’r, No. 4991-04S, 2005 WL 2649124, at *18 (T.C. Oct. 17, 
2005).
391 See Thomassen v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1397, 1409 (2011).
392 See Clarke Study, supra note 198, at 849.
393 See id. 
394 See Coercive Control, supra note 356, at 169.
395 See Clark Study, supra note 198, at 849–850. The IRS does not reveal personal 
information to protect the requesting spouse. Id. at 850 n.132 (citing IRS Innocent Spouse 
Questions and Answers, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-
businesses-self-employed/innocent-spouse-questions-and-answers [https://perma.cc/T2GN-
DFQJ]).
396 See id. at 850, 850 n.133 (explaining that if there is an appeal, protected information 
becomes discovery; however, Tax Court Rule 27 (d)(1) does permit the requesting spouse to 
request a protective order that would require redaction).
397 See, e.g., Nihiser v. Comm’r, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1531, 1536–37 (2008) 
(characterizing nonphysical abuse as “easily exaggerate[d]” where the wife alleged verbal 
abuse from her husband who was suffering from drug addiction). This was the first time that 
a Tax Court recognized “objective indications” of abuse that did not involve physical 
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regulations do not address whether financial control constitutes circumstantial 
evidence of abuse.398 Perhaps most relevantly for this Article, Clarke argues that 
financial abuse should serve as a lens through which to view the other factors in 
Revenue Ruling 2003-61, such as the “knowledge or reason to know” factor.399
The “knowledge or reason to know” factor means that a requesting spouse 
“did not know and had no reason to know of the item giving rise to the 
deficiency.”400 As discussed earlier, “actual knowledge” that money was 
received often disqualifies wives in the section 6015(c) context as well.401
Clarke emphasizes that financial abuse, along with allegations of other types of 
abuse, should be enough for a requesting spouse “to be successful on this 
knowledge factor.”402 Logically, if the domestic violence victim lacks 
information about the family’s finances and is subject to abuse whenever she 
asks, she should be deemed not to have knowledge or reason to know of the item 
and therefore granted relief.403 This is even more so true in the context of a wife 
hiring a team of forensic accountants during a divorce proceeding. 
Unfortunately, the newly proposed regulations of 2012 do not incorporate this 
line of reasoning and the rationale.404
There are issues surrounding financial abuse and in particular, whether it 
could mitigate the “knowledge” factor in determining whether relief is 
merited.405 Many times, victims are not aware of tax and other financial affairs 
because the noncompliant spouse exerts control over the information.406 This is 
even more so the case in the specific types of divorces discussed. Again, if the 
wife had access to financial information, she would not need to hire a team of 
forensic accountants or attempt to use family law proceeding discovery motions 
to unearth information. Fortunately, at times, Tax Court judges have upheld 
mental and emotional abuse claims where extreme financial control is shown.407
For example, in Bishop v. Commissioner, the wife was prohibited from 
accessing the couple’s bank accounts.408 Notably, there was no allegation of 
physical abuse.409 Her request for innocent spouse relief was granted.410
However, the Tax Court’s rulings where financial abuse is alleged have not 
been consistent. Prior to Bishop, the Tax Court denied a nurse’s request for 
                                                                                                                     
violence, such as isolation, threatening suicide, substance abuse, and degrading the victim, 
among others. See Clarke Study, supra note 198, at 852.
398 Clarke Study, supra note 198, at 854.
399 See id. at 855.
400 See id. at 855 (quoting Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296). 
401 See, e.g., Cheshire v. Comm’r, 282 F.3d 326, 336 (5th Cir. 2002).
402 Clarke Study, supra note 198, at 855.
403 See id.
404 See id. at 854. 
405 See id. at 832. 
406 Id. at 852. 
407 Bishop v. Comm’r, No. 7595-06S, 2008 WL 852028, at *8 (T.C. Mar. 31, 2008).
408 Id. at *2.
409 Id. at *4.
410 Id. at *8.
2019] OFFSHORE TAX ENFORCEMENT AND DIVORCE 571
relief, finding that given her education she could not have been “oblivious” to 
the family’s finances.411 Given that wives may readily prove financial abuse and 
the attendant difficulties with proving physical abuse, the Tax Court’s hesitancy 
in recognizing the former is distressing.412 Greater judicial recognition of 
financial abuse is the key to providing more abuse victims with appropriate 
relief in this context.413
Notably, in January 2012, the IRS issued a proposed revenue procedure that 
would modify IRS review of innocent spouse relief requests, particularly in 
regard to abuse.414 In other words, it would supplant Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-
32 I.R.B. 296.415 As detailed in Notice 2012-8, the proposed regulation would 
address how abuse could influence a spouse’s reluctance to challenge false or 
fraudulent statements on a tax return.416 Although the proposed regulation is a 
step forward in confronting some of the problems plaguing wives seeking 
innocent spouse relief, additional guidance is necessary given the current 
inadequacies discussed herein.417 For example, as stated above, most domestic 
violence victims do not have the police reports and protective orders that Tax 
Court judges require to make a finding of abuse.418 Moreover, the judges do not 
have clear criteria for making a determination on the issue of abuse.419
E. Remaining Issues 
At the same time, there is a potential for abuse in modifying innocent spouse 
relief in the manner proposed. For example, a “not so innocent spouse” who 
actually knew about offshore accounts/assets and the failure to report, may be 
allowed to keep the luxuries afforded by a violation of the law.420 Undeniably, 
some spouses likely would collude together to use innocent spouse relief to 
reduce their tax liability.421 At the same time, former spouses may use innocent 
spouse relief to escape tax liability while also punishing their former spouse.422
In thinking about possible expansion, one must consider the current system 
and the current scholarly landscape in terms of reform. The current system, most 
recently modified in January 2012 by the Treasury Department, already 
                                                                                                                     
411 Smith v. Comm’r, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 963, 967 (2001).
412 See Clarke Study, supra note 198, at 853.
413 Id. 
414 See id. at 853–854 (discussing I.R.S. Notice 2012-8, 2012-4 I.RB. 309).
415 See id. at 854. 
416 See id. 
417 See id. 
418 See id. 
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420 See McMahon, supra note 162, at 145. 
421 See id. at 144 n.15 (noting that it is impossible to anticipate the frequency of this 
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response to Congress’s perceived collusive income shifting).
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absolves spouses who were not coerced but who chose to sign returns.423
Generally, such spouses have benefited from paying less tax due to the filing of 
a false return.424
However, a particularly important general distinction may be drawn in the 
case of wives of noncompliant spouses. It is likely that these wives have not 
benefited substantially from the filing of false or fraudulent returns because the 
noncompliant spouses likely also committed financial abuse and reinvested the 
hidden assets into other offshore ventures.425 After all, if the wife of a 
noncompliant spouse was benefiting substantially from the offshore funds, she 
may have become alerted to their presence.426 The wives discussed in this 
Article have remained largely in the dark about their husband’s offshore 
finances, necessitating the hiring of teams of forensic accountants.
Some of the viewpoints on innocent spouse relief do not adequately reflect 
wives’ agency.427 While scholars agree that feminist theory cannot provide a 
clear direction for tax policy, it is a vital aspect to any discussion of innocent 
spouse relief.428 There is no uniform feminist position regarding most tax 
issues.429 The main reason for the lack of consensus is that liberal feminists 
contend for equality between the sexes while cultural feminists contend there 
are inherent differences between women and men.430 There are shifting 
viewpoints between protectionist and equality models that inform the debate.431
A related paradox is how women could be equal in terms of the law but still 
disadvantaged when compared to men.432 McMahon argues that an expansion 
of innocent spouse relief may have the ill effect of further “reinforcing wives’
vulnerability.”433 However, this Article takes the view that expanding innocent 
spouse relief, particularly in cases of financial and other domestic abuse, will 
                                                                                                                     
423 See Rev. Proc. 2013-34, 2013-43 1.R.B. 397.
424 McMahon, supra note 162, at 145.
425 McCarden, supra note 29, at 28–29.
426 See id. 
427 McMahon, supra note 162, at 145 n.17. As McMahon points out, gendered 
implications associated with innocent spouse relief are more complicated because same-sex 
couples can file joint returns. Id. at 145. This Article also does not address this additional 
dimension.
428 See Anne Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2003 (1996).
429 See id. (discussing the proposition that feminists disagree on policy ideas and 
objectives); McMahon, supra note 162, at 145 (discussing how a single feminist theory on 
tax policy is impossible because of conflicting ideas); see, e.g., Patricia Cain, Taxing 
Families Fairly, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 805 (2008).
430 McMahon, supra note 162, at 145–146; see Martha Albertson Fineman, Grappling 
with Equality: One Feminist Journey, in TRANSCENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW:
GENERATIONS OF FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY 47, 49–50 (Martha Albertson Fineman ed., 
2011).
431 See Fineman, supra note 430, at 50.
432 See McMahon, supra note 162, at 146. See generally MARTHA ALBERSTON FINEMAN,
THE AUTONOMY MYTH (2004).
433 See McMahon, supra note 162, at 168–74 (discussing whether innocent spouse relief 
hurts wives although it was enacted to help them).
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empower women to report the offshore tax and other misdeeds of their 
noncompliant spouses.
Domestic abuse is an area that the United States as a whole is just beginning 
to understand.434 Tax Court judges and tax practitioners do not normally deal 
with domestic abuse.435 The U.S. Department of the Treasury, the IRS, and 
many Tax Court judges have acknowledged that they are not familiar with the 
complexities of domestic violence.436 Reform must occur so that victims of 
domestic violence may obtain equitable relief under section 6015(f) or relief 
under section 6015(c) even if a Tax Court judge is unfamiliar with domestic 
violence.437 One way this may happen is through permitting financial abuse, 
coupled with other forms of abuse, to satisfy the “knowledge factor.” The 
underlying rationale for doing so makes sense.
IV. WIVES AS OFFSHORE WHISTLEBLOWERS DURING DIVORCE
The government has two primary ways of discovering tax noncompliance 
under current law.438 The main way is through governmental examination 
power, which enables the government to audit taxpayers’ returns and then reach 
a conclusion as to whether such returns comply with the law.439 The second way 
is through using whistleblowers who may serve as a “tool for peeking inside the 
otherwise private zone of voluntary compliance.”440 The government and the 
IRS lack the resources to investigate privately the immense amount of offshore 
tax evasion in the United States.441 Thus, we should encourage wives who have
uncovered information regarding offshore tax cheating during divorce to whistle 
blow.442 A system for doing so must take into account necessary protections in 
light of the risks posed, especially where abuse has been a factor.443
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Empowering wives to whistle blow will have exponential effects as partners and 
business associates of noncompliant spouses also will be identified.444
A. IRS Whistleblower Program 
Since 1867, the IRS has had the authority to pay monetary awards to 
whistleblowers who report tax frauds and evaders.445 The initial IRS 
Whistleblowing Program under I.R.C. § 7623 was ineffective due to its 
decentralized management, inadequate oversight, and restriction to only 
discretionary awards.446 In 2006, these shortcomings resulted in Congress’
amending the program to incentivize potential whistleblowers to report tax fraud 
and evasion.447 I.R.C. § 7623 has been interpreted as providing the IRS with 
broad discretion in terms of determining and paying whistleblower awards.448
Prior to 2006, the IRS gave a minimum award of 1% and a maximum award of 
15% of amounts recovered, which was capped at $2 million.449 Whistleblowers 
had no right to appeal award decisions, and there were no advertisements for the 
program.450 Moreover, IRS employees could not seek out potential 
whistleblowers.451
Congress amended section 7623 with section 406 of the Tax Relief and 
Health Care Act of 2006.452 A major aim of the amendments was to encourage 
whistleblowers to report tax fraud and evasion and thereby raise revenue for the 
government.453 A significant change was the increase in the amount of 
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445 Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for Tax, 61 TAX LAW. 357, 381–
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450 See Michelle M. Kwon, Whistling Dixie About the IRS Whistleblower Program 
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that before the 2006 amendment, whistleblowers had no right to judicial appeals).
451 Id. 
452 Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 406, 120 Stat. 2922, 
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I.R.C. § 7623 (2012). Notably, whistleblower claims under § 7623(b) are appealable whereas 
those under the prior 2006 amendment, i.e., § 7623(a) are not. I.R.C. § 7623(b)(4) (2012); 
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2019] OFFSHORE TAX ENFORCEMENT AND DIVORCE 575
whistleblower awards.454 Congress made this step in order to decrease the tax 
gap, i.e., “the difference between what taxpayers owe and the amount timely 
paid.”455 The tax gap is a result of the voluntary compliance aspect of our federal 
income tax system.456 It is no secret that the IRS uses the whistleblower program 
to raise revenue.457 In 2015, missing tax revenue totaled at least $450 billion.458
Most of this amount is due to unreported taxes.459
The requirements for a whistleblower award are straightforward under the 
current law.460 There are three main requirements: (1) the whistleblower 
discloses information regarding tax noncompliance dealing with over $2 
million;461 (2) this information “substantially contributes” to the IRS’s filing an 
administrative or judicial action;462 and (3) the IRS collects funds due to an 
action or settlement.463 The IRS may deny a claim if it already has the 
information the whistleblower provided, there is no finding of liability, or the 
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taxpayer is judgment proof.464 Additionally, a whistleblower may not receive 
an award if found to be part of the planning or instigation of the tax scheme.465
While the amendments to the IRS Whistleblower Program have resulted in more 
reporting, it does not appear that high quality leads have been reported.466 This 
Article addresses how the revamped IRS Whistleblower Program may be used 
to reduce the international tax gap through the reporting of wives in high-net-
worth divorce proceedings described in Part I. 
The tax whistleblower program under I.R.C. § 7623 has been criticized 
frequently over the last several years.467 In 2006, Congress revised the 
whistleblower program in connection with the Tax Relief and Health Care Act 
of 2006.468 However, counsel for potential whistleblowers have emphasized 
several continued shortcomings of the program.469 At least one of these 
shortcomings is not relevant to the wives that are subject to this Article.470
The IRS Whistleblower Program is an under-utilized resource for several 
reasons.471 Some scholars have chosen to place the blame squarely at the IRS’s
feet, noting its woeful underutilization of whistleblowers.472 While most legal 
scholarship on whistleblower programs takes as a premise the ability of the 
agency to use effectively a tip, this assumption has been challenged in at least 
                                                                                                                     
464 See Kwon, supra note 450, at 466–67; Confidentiality and Disclosure for 
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2019] OFFSHORE TAX ENFORCEMENT AND DIVORCE 577
the tax arena.473 Although there are similarities between the amended IRS 
Whistleblower Program and the False Claims Act qui tam actions, there are 
significant differences between the two.474 These differences have spurred some 
scholars to consider whether the IRS should also allow for a qui tam action.475
Currently, there is not a qui tam action available for tax reporters.476
B. Empowering Wives to Report Offshore Tax Evasion
Whistleblowing has been perceived as disconcerting and even morally 
reprehensible since at first glance it may appear to rely upon “bad blood” such 
as that associated with “office politics or a divorce.”477 One scholar states there 
are “serious moral issues” with rewarding individuals for telling on other’s tax 
noncompliance.478 However, in the circumstance of a noncompliant spouse 
acting wrongfully in the family law and tax contexts, this condemnation of 
whistleblowing is not justified.479
In arguing for a repeal of the Whistleblower Program during the
Congressional debate of the 1998 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and 
Reform Act, Senator Harry Reid characterized the Whistleblower program as 
the “Reward for Rats” program and denounced it as the “Snitch Program.”480
Specifically, Senator Reid noted giving money to “snitches” to report their 
“associates, employers, relatives, and [ex-spouses]” [was] “unseemly, 
distasteful, and just wrong.”481 Nevertheless, as explained above, just eight 
years later, Congress decided to expand the program in 2006.482 Regardless of 
the perceived moral pitfalls, the program has survived because it does result in 
leads regarding tax evasion and fraud, which enhances tax enforcement efforts 
thereby tightening the tax gap.483
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This Article contends that in the divorce context presented, i.e., where a 
husband is showing a flagrant disregard for discovery in a family law 
proceeding and for tax reporting, whistleblowing should be viewed as a 
necessary tool for shedding light onto darkness. This is especially just when one 
considers the likelihood that at least financial abuse may have also been present 
in the marriage.484 Granted, one may take issue with Bradley Birkenfield’s
award given his involvement in criminal activity.485 However, an innocent wife 
who had no knowledge of her husband’s tax noncompliance and who is later 
confronted with his overall noncompliance in terms of revealing assets during a 
divorce proceeding is a different story. One observer asks, “Is it not morally 
reprehensible to allow a criminal to become wealthy from a tax evasion scheme 
in which he was personally involved?”486 In contrast, a wife who is an innocent 
spouse has at least been determined not to have been personally involved.487
There is nothing wrong in allowing her to report tax noncompliance.
Furthermore, innocent spouses who are eligible for a whistleblower award 
may help to alleviate some of the needless backlog that accompanies most 
family law proceedings where a noncompliant spouse is the party on the other 
side.488 In fact, the wife may decide to stop expending funds on forensic 
accountants and motions to compel if she may receive a share of the marital 
assets through a whistleblower award. At the same time, of course, there will be 
wives who would prefer to keep using the family law proceedings with the hope 
that the marital assets would not have to be shared with the government through 
the rectifying of unpaid tax. However, this Article addresses the truly innocent 
spouse who desires to remedy the wrongs of the marriage and to move on with 
her life in a compliant manner.
There are of course numerous downsides to whistleblowing,489 and it is 
unthinkable that a wife would do so without the guarantee of innocent spouse 
relief. She could end up in jail if criminal prosecution of the husband is 
                                                                                                                     
484 See Maya Kachroo-Levine, Financial Abuse: How to Identify It and What You Can 
Do to Help, FORBES (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mayakachroolevine/20
17/09/25/financial-abuse-how-to-identify-it-and-what-you-can-do-to-help/#55fcbd4f429b 
[https://perma.cc/7RC3-P7QJ] (noting that financial abuse is present in 99% of domestic 
violence cases).
485 Aldinger, supra note 446, at 931 (suggesting that Bradley Birkenfield was only 
spared because of his more limited criminal involvement instead of having been “the 
mastermind of the tax violations” and noting that Bradley Birkenfield received the largest 
whistleblower award in history in 2012 in the amount of $104 million).
486 Aldinger, supra note 446, at 931. 
487 See supra Part II.B. 
488 See Natalia Teper, “Sheridan Issues,” LAW-RELATED REFLECTIONS (Oct. 10, 2018),
https://teperlaw.wordpress.com/2018/10/10/sheridan-issues/ [https://perma.cc/8F5R-GAYS]
(discussing possible delays in family court stemming from tax issues).
489 The whistleblowing process is long, and the threat of retaliation is a real one. In the 
employment context, as Aldinger notes, whistleblowers sometimes become unemployable, 
and there is a high correlation between whistleblowers and bankruptcy. Aldinger, supra note 
446, at 932.
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successful or with heavy civil penalties to pay.490 If she has primary custody of 
the children, she will be unlikely to take such exorbitant risks without the 
assurance of innocent spouse relief. Unlike other tax whistleblowers, her 
identity would not be protected.491 Just as fear of retaliation would cause some 
wives not to seek innocent spouse relief, it would also deter them from tax 
whistleblowing.492 Unfortunately, there is no federal law prohibiting retaliation 
in the tax whistleblowing context.493
Currently, there is not much literature on why whistleblowers choose to 
report noncompliance.494 As one author has stated, “[t]he primary purpose of 
the IRS Whistleblower Program is to encourage the reporting of major tax 
noncompliance issues.”495 Scholars have condemned whistleblowers as also 
likely to have had unclean hands.496 However, the IRS has acknowledged this
possibility and is comfortable with it.497 Stephen Whitlock, the first director of 
the IRS Whistleblower Office, specifically stated that “the law recognizes that 
[whistleblowers may have unclean hands], and that’s OK.”498 Similarly, in the 
context of innocent spouse relief, there will be times when a wife has benefited 
from the tax fraud or tax evasion; however, a parallel public policy rationale 
also justifies extending innocent spouse relief in the context examined in this 
Article.
What scholars do know is that factors such as “the level of moral outrage”
and “the scale of the harm” motivate some whistleblowers to come forward.499
A wife who has dealt with a noncompliant spouse in a multi-year divorce 
proceeding and who ultimately finds out her spouse has been hiding offshore 
assets and accounts would be motivated by both of these factors. The usual 
impediments to whistleblowing could largely be overcome provided she 
receives innocent spouse relief. Yuval Feldman and Orly Lobel’s recent 
empirical study examines the legal factors that cut in favor of whistleblowing, 
including anti-retaliation measures and monetary incentives.500
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In the context of a contentious, multi-year divorce proceeding, a primary 
motivating factor for the wife of a noncompliant spouse is shortening the 
proceedings. For example, if the wife is likely to be granted primary custody of 
children, she especially will want to end the proceedings as quickly as possible. 
The wife’s eligibility for a whistleblower award may help to significantly 
shorten the division of assets portion of the divorce proceedings. Once her 
forensic accountants are able to uncover hidden offshore assets, theoretically 
she could whistle blow and share in a portion of the assets through the granting 
of a whistleblower award. In other words, if the wife can secure a whistleblower 
award, the division of assets proceedings will be truncated. The IRS will likely 
receive not only a single lead in regard to the noncompliant spouse’s tax 
deficiencies but also several leads in terms of his partners and co-conspirators 
in defrauding the government. Again, a necessary element is that the wife could 
secure innocent spouse relief before blowing the whistle.501
Granted, wives who did know or have reason to know about the 
noncompliant husband’s offshore tax fraud and/or evasion and who decided to 
look the other way should not receive innocent spouse relief.502 These wives 
may still choose to whistle blow, but of course, they would remain liable for the 
previously undisclosed tax liabilities.503 As stated above, the IRS has 
acknowledged some whistleblowers do have unclean hands, but it deems this 
acceptable given the role they may play in increasing tax enforcement.504 For 
example, there is a possibility that some wives who receive innocent spouse 
relief will in fact have conspired with their husbands against the government 
during the marriage and will choose to become whistleblowers. In order to 
minimize this possibility, the wife should be required to show the husband’s
noncompliance during the proceedings and evidence of efforts and expenditures 
to uncover his offshore accounts during the proceedings, e.g., the hiring of 
forensic accountants, filings of motions to compel, etc. Of course, the hiring of 
accountants could be gamed to feign lack of knowledge but that should occur 
infrequently. The relatively small number of cases where a wife has taken the 
same actions as one who had no knowledge or reason to know is justified by the 
increase in tax enforcement and related tightening of the tax gap in terms of 
offshore evasion.
At the same time, regardless of the desire to shorten the proceedings or for 
a reward, the wives described in Part II may decide to whistle blow for moral or 
religious reasons, reflecting the need to expose the deceitful behavior of what 
are likely abusive spouses. Monetary incentives are not always the major factor 
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in a whistleblower’s decision, and “moral outrage,505 religion or faith,506 and 
revenge”507 may serve as primary motivators. Whistleblowers also state a sense 
of “legitimacy” serves as a motivating factor.508 Here, “legitimacy” means a 
“feeling of obligation to obey the law and to defer to the decisions made by legal 
authorities.”509 The factors from the Feldman and Lobel study certainly apply 
in the corporate or employment context, and some are also relevant to the 
divorce context. However, one must acknowledge other factors that are akin to 
the women who chose to report publicly in the #MeToo movement.510 Many of 
the women who stepped forward to expose sexual harassment in the #MeToo
movement were motivated by a sense of justice and a desire to embolden other 
women to speak out about their experiences with harassment.511 These same 
motivating rationales would be present in a high-net-worth divorce involving 
abuse as well.
V. CONCLUSION
The Panama Papers have revealed that high-net-worth tax evaders use 
offshore accounts to hide money from the IRS as well as their spouses.512 As a 
result, offshore tax enforcement efforts must harness the potential of divorce 
proceedings to reduce the international tax gap. While the government and the 
IRS may lack the time and resources to find hidden offshore accounts, wives 
involved in high-net-worth divorce proceedings hire teams of forensic 
accountants for that very purpose. Currently, a wealthy husband who refuses to 
disclose offshore accounts to his wife is not held accountable in the tax context 
for his noncompliance in the divorce context. Given that willfulness must be 
proven to impose civil or criminal liability, family law discovery devices must 
be modified to ensure their knowing disregard of reporting obligations may be 
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proven. Moreover, such spouses should be deemed ineligible for tax amnesty 
programs after continued noncompliance.
The current denial of innocent spouse relief to the wives of noncompliant 
offshore tax evaders creates an unjust outcome. Without the assurance of 
innocent spouse relief, these women are left vulnerable to civil and criminal 
liability. Often wives in omitted income cases are denied innocent spouse relief 
because of a mismatch in terms of the “knowledge” requirement as applied to 
husbands versus wives. Willfulness on the part of the husband requires 
knowledge of the tax reporting obligations. However, “knowledge” that income 
was received, even where the source of such funds is unknown, disqualifies 
wives from innocent spouse relief. To solve this problem, an approach that takes 
into consideration the nature of domestic abuse, including financial abuse, is 
necessary. Domestic abuse is likely present in the divorce proceedings at issue 
since the high-net-worth tax evaders are typically the primary earners, and their 
hiding of assets is evidence of financial control. Revised Treasury Regulations 
must provide guidance in terms of what constitutes abuse and confirm that 
financial control is indeed circumstantial evidence of abuse.
The majority of the wives described in Part II necessarily had undergone 
financial abuse as evidenced by their need to hire forensic accountants and to 
file motions to compel in the divorce proceedings. This Article contends that 
financial abuse should serve as an appropriate ground for granting wives 
innocent spouse relief in the context of high-net-worth divorces involving 
noncompliant spouses. The presence of financial abuse in this context 
demonstrates that the wives did not have “knowledge” of the hidden offshore 
funds.
Ensuring that the wives of high-net-worth tax evaders are granted innocent 
spouse relief will empower their reporting of offshore tax fraud and evasion. 
This will lead to the uncovering of vast networks of offshore evasion as the 
partners and business associates of the high-net-worth tax evaders are disclosed 
as well. Empowering wives of offshore tax evaders to whistle blow on their 
husbands’ misdeeds will lead to greater offshore tax enforcement and shorten 
divorce proceedings. The empowerment of these women will also result in an 
important step forward in how the United States perceives and treats victims of 
abuse.
